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Abstract 
In this EUDO CITIZENSHIP Forum Debate, several authors discuss the growing trend in Europe and 
North America of using denationalisation of citizens as a counter-terrorism strategy. The deprivation 
of citizenship status, alongside passport revocation, and denial of re-admission to citizens returning 
from abroad, manifest the securitisation of citizenship. Britain leads in citizenship deprivation, but in 
2014, Canada passed new citizenship-stripping legislation and France’s Conseil Constitutionnel 
recently upheld denaturalisation of dual citizens convicted of terrorism-related offences. In the wake 
of the ongoing crisis in Iraq and Syria, assorted legislators in Austria, Australia, the Netherlands, and 
the United States have expressed interest in enacting (or reviving) similar legislation. The contributors 
to the Forum Debate consider the normative justification for citizenship deprivation from a variety of 
disciplinary perspectives. There is relatively little disagreement among commentators about the 
limited instrumental value of citizenship revocation in enhancing national security, and more diversity 
in viewpoint about its significance for citizenship itself. The contributors discuss the characterisation 
of citizenship as right versus privilege, the relevance of statelessness and dual nationality, the relative 
merits of citizenship versus human rights as normative framework, and the expansiveness of 
banishment itself as a concept. 
Kickoff contribution and rejoinder by Audrey Macklin. Comments by Peter Spiro, Peter H. Schuck, 
Christian Joppke, Vesco Paskalev, Bronwen Manby, Kay Hailbronner, Rainer Bauböck, Linda 
Bosniak, Daniel Kanstroom, Matthew J. Gibney, Ruvi Ziegler, Saskia Sassen and Jo Shaw. 
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 1 
Kick-Off contribution 
Audrey Macklin* 
After decades in exile, banishment is back. Britain resuscitated the practice as part of its counter-
terrorism strategy in the wake of the 9/11 and 7/11 terrorist attacks in New York, Washington and 
London. Canada followed suit with the 2014 Strengthening Canadian Citizenship Act. As of late 2014, 
assorted legislators in Austria, Australia, Netherlands, and the United States expressed interest in 
enacting (or reviving) citizenship stripping laws.
1
  
From antiquity to the late 20
th
 century, denationalisation was a tool used by states to rid themselves 
of political dissidents, convicted criminals and ethnic, religious or racial minorities. The latest target of 
denationalisation is the convicted terrorist, or the suspected terrorist, or the potential terrorist, or 
maybe the associate of a terrorist. He is virtually always Muslim and male.  
Citizenship-stripping is sometimes defended in the name of strengthening citizenship, but it does 
precisely the opposite. The defining feature of contemporary legal citizenship is that it is secure. 
Making legal citizenship contingent on performance demotes citizenship to another category of 
permanent residence. Citizenship revocation thus weakens citizenship itself. It is an illegitimate form 
of punishment and it serves no practical purpose. 
Denationalisation refers to involuntary loss of citizenship.
2
 Denaturalisation is a subset of 
denationalisation, and applies selectively to those not born into citizenship via ius soli or ius sanguinis. 
The most common basis for denaturalisation is fraud or misrepresentation in the acquisition of 
citizenship. The operative premise is that had the material facts been known at the relevant time, the 
state would not have conferred citizenship in the first place. Denaturalisation for fraud simply annuls 
the erroneously conferred citizenship and restores the status quo ante.
3
 
My remarks focus exclusively on denationalisation for allegedly disloyal conduct by a citizen, 
while a citizen. In its present incarnation, citizenship revocation is best understood as a technique for 
extending the functionality of immigration law in counter-terrorism. Since 2001, states have turned to 
deportation to resolve threats to national security by displacing the embodied threat to the country of 
nationality. But deporting one’s own citizens is exile, and exile extinguishes a singular right of 
citizenship, namely the right to enter and to remain. Citizenship revocation circumvents that problem 
by introducing the two-step exile: first, strip citizenship; second, deport the newly minted alien.  
The British Nationality Act authorises the Secretary of State for Home Affairs (Home Secretary) to 
deprive a person of British citizenship where she “is satisfied that deprivation is conducive to the 
public good.” That happens to be the same low and vague standard for depriving a person of 
permanent resident status (indefinite leave to remain), which provides one illustration of the 
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 University of Toronto. 
1
 For a more elaborate comparative analysis of recent legislative developments in the United Kingdom, Canada and the 
US, see Audrey Macklin, “Citizenship Revocation, the Privilege to Have Rights and the Production of the Alien”, (2014) 
40 Queens Law Journal 1-54. 
2
 Before the widespread acceptance of dual citizenship, acquisition of a second citizenship or marriage to a foreign man 
commonly triggered denaturalisation. In a world where states tolerated only one legal bond between individual and state 
at a time, acquisition of a second nationality denoted a transfer of membership from one state to another. 
3
 The United States law combines renunciation of citizenship and denationalisation for birthright citizens into a category 
labelled expatriation. The US Constitution guarantees the citizenship of ius soli citizens as a constitutional right. The 
doctrine of expatriation operated on the legal fiction that certain acts by a citizen denoted an intention to renounce 
citizenship. In a series of judgments culminating in 1967 in Afroyim v. Rusk, the US Supreme Court progressively 
restricted the government’s ability to deem conduct short of explicit renunciation as conclusive proof of an intention to 
expatriate, and the executive effectively abandoned attempts to pursue constructive expatriation in the 1980s.  
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downgrading of citizenship. In Canada, the executive power to revoke citizenship depends on a 
criminal conviction for a listed offence and a minimum sentence of either five years or life 
imprisonment. The offences include treason, spying, any terrorism offence defined under the Criminal 
Code and a variety of offences applicable to members of the military. In the case of terrorism offences, 
the conviction may be by a foreign court for an offence committed outside Canada, if it would also 
constitute a terrorism offence under Canadian law.
4
 The UK law authorises citizenship stripping of 
naturalised citizens (but not birthright citizens) even if it renders them stateless. The Canadian law 
prohibits the creation of statelessness but puts the onus on the individual to satisfy the Minister that 
statelessness would ensue from revocation. The UK declines to publicly disclose the exact number, 
identities or circumstances of those deprived of UK citizenship, but investigatory journalists estimate 
that at least 53 Britons have lost citizenship since 2002, over half on national security grounds. In 
2013, the Home Secretary deprived 20 UK nationals of citizenship, more than all other years since 
2002 combined.
5
 The Canadian legislation has yet to be declared in force. 
Citizenship revocation raises an array of practical, legal and normative questions: Does it advance a 
valid objective? Does it comply with domestic, constitutional and/or transnational law? Is it 
normatively defensible? The answers turn, in part, on one’s underlying conception of citizenship as 
legal status. Defenders of citizenship revocation liturgically intone that “citizenship is a privilege, not 
a right”. The rhetoric of citizenship-as-privilege trades on a popular and laudable sentiment that is 
sometimes expressed as follows: ‘I feel privileged to be a citizen of Canada, or the UK, or Italy, etc, 
and I consider it my duty to demonstrate my commitment through actively participating in civic life, 
or joining the armed forces, and standing up for my country as a good and loyal citizen should do.’ 
But a privilege in law is something different: A privilege emanates from the patron (here a government 
minister) and can be rescinded from an undeserving beneficiary (here the citizen) at the former’s 
discretion.  
In two US Supreme Court cases in the 1950s, Chief Justice Warren rejected the classification of 
citizenship as privilege, proclaiming that “citizenship is not a licence that expires on misbehaviour”. 
Instead, he invoked Hannah Arendt’s famous depiction of citizenship as “no less than the right to have 
rights.”6 Framing citizenship as a right vests citizenship in the rights-bearer. Depicting it as a meta-
right dramatically increases the justificatory burden for any curtailment, because it places all rights in 
the balance.  
Yet the force of Arendt’s ‘right to have rights’ aphorism may seem attenuated, at least with respect 
to liberal democratic states of the twenty first century. After all, permanent residents enjoy almost all 
the same rights as citizens, and even foreigners without status can, in principle, claim a long menu of 
basic human rights under international law and many domestic legal orders. But this rejoinder 
overlooks one crucial fact. The exercise of virtually all rights depends on territorial presence within 
the state,
7
 and only citizens have an unqualified right to enter and remain on state territory. So once 
stripped of the right to enter and remain in the state, enforcement means that one is effectively 
deprived of all the other rights that depend (de jure or de facto) on territorial presence. This fact has 
                                                     
4
 The law also permits revocation of a citizen who ‘served as a member of an armed force of a country or as a member of 
an organised armed group and that country or group was engaged in an armed conflict with Canada.’ This is not a 
criminal offence, though it is almost identical to the existing offence of treason, except that it includes non-state armed 
groups, whereas the offence of treason only includes armed forces of a state.  
5
 Id. 
6
 The unattributed quote comes from Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, (New York: Harcourt & Brace, 
1951), at 294. It was picked up by US Supreme Court Justice Warren in Perez v. Brownell, 356 US 54 (1958) at 64 and 
again in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) at 102. See discussion in Patrick Weil, The Sovereign Citizen (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013). 
7
 Expatriate voting is one exception. Many people suppose that diplomatic or consular assistance is also a right available 
outside the territory of the state, except that states tend to deny that they owe a legal duty to extend assistance to their 
citizens abroad. See, e.g. R (Abbasi) v Foreign Secretary [2002] EWCA Civ 1598. 
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not been lost on the present UK government: With two exceptions, all her targets were abroad when 
the Home Secretary chose to exercise her discretion to strip them of citizenship. This meant they were 
absent and unable to respond when the notice of intention to deprive was delivered, and therefore 
barred from entry qua alien in order to appeal the decision. 
Another strand of citizenship discourse describes citizenship as a contract in which the citizen 
pledges allegiance to the sovereign in exchange for the sovereign’s protection. Acts of disloyalty 
amount to fundamental breach of contract, and so citizenship revocation simply actualises in law the 
citizen’s voluntary severance of the relationship. This was, more or less, the logic of constructive 
expatriation under US law
8
. But neither the rhetoric of contract nor privilege can mask the flagrantly 
punitive rationale for the citizenship revocation regimes currently in play in the UK and Canada: 
baldly stated, some citizens are very bad citizens, and therefore do not deserve to be citizens. The 
move from ‘bad citizen’ to ‘not citizen’ is explicit in the Canadian law, where conviction for a 
criminal offence is a condition precedent to revocation and eventual deportation. Citizenship 
revocation in the UK arguably turns on prevention of future risk rather than punishment for past 
wrong, but statements by UK politicians like ‘We think that deprivation is a way of expressing 
extreme displeasure at the way in which someone has behaved’, reveal that the difference is more 
apparent than real.
9
  
Banishment as criminal penalty has a long pedigree, and dates to a time before the rise of penal 
systems that enabled states to segregate, punish, rehabilitate and reintegrate wrongdoers within the 
state. In other words, modern states have criminal justice systems and an infrastructure that obviates 
the utility of banishment. These systems can, and are, deployed in response to the range of conduct 
encompassed under the rubric of terrorism. Banishment is both superfluous and anachronistic. 
One might counter that offences threatening national security are qualitatively distinct from other 
offences. For these putative ‘crimes against citizenship’, incarceration is insufficient and withdrawal 
of citizenship is uniquely appropriate as supplement or substitute. It bears noting, however, that none 
of the Canadian offences precipitating loss of citizenship on grounds of national security – including 
treason – apply exclusively to citizens. Moreover, the idea that ‘national security’ misconduct is an 
affront to the state and so warrants a distinctive punishment fails to take proper account of the fact that 
all crime is regarded as an affront to the state’s maintenance of public order (the ‘King’s Peace’ in 
common law systems) and its monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. It is this public dimension 
of criminal law that differentiates it from private law, and confers on the state the authority to 
investigate, prosecute and punish wrongdoers, in addition to and apart from any private remedy that an 
individual victim might seek in tort, contract or property.  
The purported symmetry between ‘crimes against citizenship’ and denationalisation echoes the 
defence of the sovereign’s other technique for permanent elimination of wrongdoers, namely the death 
penalty. Banishment fits the crime of disloyalty the way capital punishment fits the crime of murder. 
When tethered to expulsion, citizenship revocation effects a kind of ‘political death’. A citizen 
stripped of nationality and banished from the territory is, for all intents and purposes, dead to the state. 
Once outside the territory, the state has neither legal claim nor legal duty in respect of the former 
citizen, and is relieved of any obligation to object if another state tortures, renders or kills one of its 
nationals.
10
 Indeed, denationalisation is not only a political analogue to death, it may also be a prelude 
                                                     
8
 The US model of expatriation implicitly relied on this metaphor to characterise a series of acts, from desertion, to voting 
in a foreign election, as acts signifying an intention to renounce citizenship. 
9
 See See United Kingdom, Parliamentary Debates, HC Standing Committee E, 30 April 2002, col 54 (Angela Eagle), 
quoted in Rayner Thwaites, “The Security of Citizenship?: Finnis in the Context of the United Kingdom’s Citizenship 
Stripping Provisions”, in Fiona Jenkins, Mark Nolan and Kim Rubenstein, eds., Allegiance and Identity in a Globalised 
World (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 243-66.- at note 94. 
10
 Since the United States’ lethal drone strike on US citizen Anwar al Awlaki (and his son), the United States’ position is 
that it may lawfully execute its own citizens without trial when they are abroad. This, of course, obviates the necessity to 
Audrey Macklin 
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to it.
11
 At least two former UK citizens were executed by US drone strikes after the Home Secretary 
deprived them of citizenship, and another was rendered to the United States for trial on terrorism 
charges.  
As with the death penalty, denationalisation extinguishes the prospect of rehabilitation or 
reintegration. The paradigmatic subject of citizenship revocation – the terrorist – is excluded from the 
ambit of human dignity that underwrites contemporary penal philosophy and affirms capacity for 
autonomy, rational self-reflection and reform. He is, in that sense, not fully human and thus incapable 
of rehabilitation. Banishment operates as pure and permanent retribution. There is no re-entry into the 
political community, no life after political death. Even creative and sophisticated attempts to classify 
and isolate those crimes that merit denationalisation from those that do not still founder on the 
instability of the distinction and the legitimacy of pure retribution.
12
  
One might object that that this parallel neglects the statelessness constraint. To the extent that a 
prerequisite of denationalisation is actual or potential possession of another citizenship, the individual 
has another political life to live somewhere else. This is also an answer to the complaint that stripping 
citizenship from dual nationals but not mono-nationals violates the principle of equality of 
citizenship.
13
 The dual national is not similarly situated to the mono-national precisely because the 
former has another citizenship and the latter does not, so differential treatment does not constitute 
invidious discrimination. (Of course, the counter-intuitive consequence of this reasoning is that dual 
citizenship becomes a liability. Multiple citizenship becomes less than the sum of its parts: the mono-
citizen is secure from revocation, while the dual or multiple citizen is not). 
The cogency of this argument depends on how one characterises the impact of citizenship 
revocation. From an external, statist perspective, the function of nationality is to catalogue the world’s 
population and to file each person under at least one state. Nationality provides states with a return 
address they can stick on non-citizens for purposes of deportation, and is one reason why statelessness 
is an inconvenient anomaly for states. And just as all sovereign states are formally equal under 
international law, so too are all citizenships. Within this framework, citizenship becomes fungible. 
Statelessness is the problem, and nationality the solution. So, it may not actually matter what 
nationality a person possesses – Canadian or Somali, Brazilian or North Korean – as long as he or she 
possesses at least one. All nationalities are equal for purposes of averting statelessness.
14
 This formal 
equality of nationality may partly explain international law’s diffidence, or at least ambiguity, on 
whether citizenship deprivation that does not induce statelessness may nevertheless be arbitrary and 
contrary to international law.
15
 In any event, as long as an individual retains a nationality somewhere, 
denationalisation poses no human rights problem. 
From an internal, individual perspective, however, citizenship is not fungible.
16
 The revocation of 
citizenship severs a unique relationship between the individual and a specific state. It is unique in two 
respects: First, the formal equality of nationality suppresses the substantive inequality of citizenship. 
The bundle of social, political, economic, cultural and legal opportunities and entitlements to which 
(Contd.)                                                                  
strip citizenship prior to execution. See “US cited controversial law in decision to kill American citizen by drone”, The 
Guardian, 23 June 2014. See also Peter Spiro, “Expatriating Terrorists”, (2014) 82 Fordham Law Review. 
11
 This was the case with the Nazi extermination of German Jewry, as Hannah Arendt recounted. First, the Nazi government 
stripped Jews of German nationality and then, when no country would take them in, proceeded to murder them. 
12
 For a recent example, see Shai Lavi, “Citizenship Revocation as Punishment: On the Modern Duties of Citizens and 
Their Criminal Breach”, (2011), 61 UTLJ 783-810, at 806. 
13
 It does not, of course, answer the charge of discrimination against naturalised mono-citizens under UK law. They are 
exposed to the risk of statelessness whereas birthright citizens are not. 
14
 One could even imagine how a creative government wedded to this view might venture that protecting mono-citizens 
from statelessness is really an affirmative action initiative under s. 15(2) of the Charter. 
15
 See Peter Spiro, “The New International Law of Citizenship”, (2011), Am J. Int’l Law, 694-746, at 711-12. 
16
 Thwaites makes a similar argument, supra note 9, at 263. 
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citizenship provides access varies radically between countries. Canadian or Brazilian citizenship is 
dramatically and indisputably heftier than that of present-day North Korea or Somalia.  
Secondly, the subjective experience of that legal bond, what the International Court of Justice in 
Nottebohm v. Guatemala calls ‘the social fact of attachment’17 is as infinitely diverse as the people 
who make up the citizenry. It may range from the ‘nominal citizen’ whose social attachment is highly 
attenuated, to the individual whose existence is, and has always been, wholly and exclusively 
embedded in the country of residence. Citizenships are not substantively equal in comparison to one 
another and the nature of the individual citizen-state relationship is not invariant. But my point is not 
to propose a metric capable of measuring the quantitative, qualitative, experiential, emotional, 
personal, familial, cultural, social, financial, linguistic and political impacts of exile on any individual, 
in order that some state official could determine precisely when citizenship revocation inflicts an 
appropriate versus excessive degree of punishment. Citizenship as legal status obviates both the need 
and the legitimacy of an ongoing or comparative evaluation by state authorities of how much or how 
well a citizen performs as a citizen.
18
 The very act of subjecting a subsisting citizenship to this kind of 
normative scrutiny subverts the security that distinguishes legal citizenship from other statuses that 
define the relationship between state and individual.  
The history of banishment generates only cautionary tales about the inevitably arbitrary and 
prejudicial abuse of a discretionary power to identify the ‘bad’ citizen for purposes of relegating him 
or her to the non-status of non-citizen. The violence of rupturing the link between citizens and state is 
not negated by possession of citizenship status in another polity, if one conceives of the relationship 
(whatever its intensity, depth, etc.) between a state and a citizen as singular and unique. On this view, 
citizenship revocation inflicts an intrinsically grave harm that is separate from (though exacerbated by) 
the harm of statelessness.
19
  
I leave to one side an account of the myriad procedural and substantive deficiencies of the UK and 
Canadian denationalisation regimes that make them ripe for legal challenge. Nor do I dwell here on 
the dubious practical value of denationalisation in preventing terrorism or protecting national security. 
Suffice to say that if the aim of citizenship revocation is deterrence, there is no evidence that stripping 
citizenship will deter a potential terrorist any more or better than the prospect of a criminal conviction 
and lengthy imprisonment or, for that matter, the risk of blowing oneself up, getting killed or executed, 
or being detained indefinitely, rendered, or tortured. To the extent that exile supposedly makes a 
country more secure by removing dangerous people, the justification knows no limits: it is not obvious 
why Canadians or Britons would not also be made safer by exiling all citizens who commit violent 
offences. From the other side, expelling convicted or alleged terrorists is an oddly parochial response 
that transfers rather than reduces risk. Depending on the destination country, deportation may actually 
make it easier for the individual to engage in activities that pose a threat to global security.
20
  
And, finally, the sheer absurdity of banishment as a response to the terrorist qua global outlaw is 
best illustrated by speculating on what would happen if all states behaved like the UK and Canada: 
Imagine a dual UK-Canada citizen who is convicted of a terrorism offence in the UK. Since terrorism 
is a global menace, Canada can treat a terrorism conviction in the UK as proof of being a bad 
Canadian citizen. Both Canada and the UK can lawfully denationalise him. But both states are also 
                                                     
17
 Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), ICJ 4 (1955) at 23. 
18
 This does not preclude an argument that the depth and duration of a resident non-citizen’s relationship to a state could 
and should generate an entitlement to remain and to be put on a path to citizenship. See, e.g. Joseph Carens, The Ethics of 
Immigration (Oxford: OUP 2013).  
19
 For a similar argument, see Rayner Thwaites, supra note 9.  
20
 Audrey Macklin, “Borderline Security”, in R.Daniels et al. (eds.), The Security of Freedom: Essays on Canada’s Anti-
Terrorism Bill (Toronto: U of T Press, 2001), 383-405; “Still Stuck at the Border”, in Craig Forcese and François 
Crépeau, eds., Terrorism, Law and Democracy: 10 Years After 9/11 (Montreal: Canadian Institute for the Administration 
of Justice, 2012), 261-306. 
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somewhat constrained in law not to create statelessness, and both want and need to find another state 
to admit the expelled person. And the only country that has a legal obligation to do is a state of 
nationality. So, now it becomes a race between Canada and the UK to see which country can strip 
citizenship first. To the loser goes the citizen.  
Modern exile, as imagined under UK and Canadian law, is erected upon unsustainable and 
incoherent propositions about the nature of legal citizenship. If citizenship is irrevocable only where 
withdrawal causes statelessness, then citizenship is a right for mono-citizens but a privilege for dual or 
multiple citizens. Legal citizenship can be contingent on normative criteria for one state if and only if 
it is not similarly contingent for another state. State A can deprive a national of citizenship and banish 
him because he is a bad citizen. But State A can do so lawfully if and only if State B is compelled to 
admit the individual simply because he is a citizen of State B, irrespective of whether he is a good or 
bad citizen of State B. One state’s authority to deem the bad citizen a non-citizen presupposes another 
state lacking that same authority.  
To contend that punitive denationalisation in the twenty-first century is an illegitimate and futile 
exercise of sovereign power does not refute or deny that social solidarity, belonging and allegiance 
have a place in conceptions of citizenship and deserve to be promoted. It is rather that these goals will 
not and cannot be advanced by citizenship revocation. Nor will citizenship revocation make any state, 
or the global community, more secure. Citizenship revocation only enhances the discretionary and 
arbitrary power of the executive, at the expense of all citizens, and of citizenship itself. Banishment 
deserves to be banished again. Permanently. 
 7 
Terrorist expatriation: All show, no byte, no future 
Peter Spiro* 
I agree with the bottom line of Audrey Macklin’s excellent kick-off for the forum. New expatriation 
measures adopted by the United Kingdom and Canada are ill-advised and possibly unlawful. The UK 
and Canada moves make for a kind of trendlet, and other states (even human rights-pure Norway) are 
considering similar measures as the “foreign fighter” phenomenon captures global attention. 
Denationalisation of terror suspects clearly merits the attention of scholars and activists; after decades 
of disuse, states are now stepping back into the practice of forced expatriation. Macklin sets the scene 
with a primer on recent developments and a powerful critique of the UK and Canadian measures. 
But I would get to the destination along another path. I see denationalisation as anachronistic and 
toothless in the face of diminished conceptions of citizenship as an institution and the changed 
locations of allegiance. The expatriation measures are empty gestures, a kind of counter-terror bravado 
to make up for the deficiency of more important material responses. Government officials must be 
seen to be doing something, and so they may (for appearances sake) throw expatriation into the 
counter-terror toolbox. But expatriation won’t advance the counter-terror agenda in any real way. 
Given the lack of policy advantage, I expect that the human rights critique will suffice to suppress the 
broad use of denationalisation in this context.  
In theory, expatriation could help shore up the boundaries of membership and national solidarity. 
Terrorist expatriation might be consistent with the historical practice of terminating nationality upon 
formal transfer of allegiance. This was once the near-universal practice; original nationality was lost 
automatically upon naturalisation in another state. Military and government service in another country 
would also typically result in expatriation, even when the other state was a friendly one. This practice 
helped police the boundaries of community. One could be a member of one or another polity, but not 
both. States that continue to prohibit dual citizenship still operate on this principle. A Japanese citizen 
who naturalises as an American, for example, automatically forfeits her Japanese nationality.  
One might situate security-related expatriation in this tradition. To the extent that fighting for the 
Islamic State represents a shift of loyalty incompatible with loyalty to the United Kingdom, 
expatriation merely reflects social conditions on the ground. Membership in the United Kingdom 
would be exclusive of membership in forces associated with the Islamic State. Expatriation clarifies 
the “us” and “them” in a way that clarifies social solidarities and the special obligations that come 
with co-nationality. (Ayelet Shachar makes a similar argument with respect to “hollow” citizens 
acquiring citizenship on the attenuated basis of descent.) 
But this logic doesn’t map out onto denationalisation in the current security context. There is no 
citizenship in the Islamic State (ISIL not being a state, the label notwithstanding). One cannot 
naturalise or be born into ISIL; there is no formal evidence of loyalty or membership. Expatriation 
doesn’t work without the symmetry. To the extent that only dual nationals are subject to security-
related expatriation, the criterion no longer makes any sense: the other citizenship is random, unrelated 
to the motivation for expatriation. (As Macklin points out, it could lead to a strange dynamic in which 
states allied against groups such as ISIL could race to expatriate foreign fighters in an effort to 
offshore putative threats.) The condition then arbitrarily discriminates against individuals on the basis 
of their dual-citizen status.  
That takes care of the only normatively tenable rationale for the expatriation measures. The 
punitive basis is more easily dispatched. Punitive uses of expatriation have long been condemned. As 
early as 1958, the U.S. Supreme Court was able to observe that “[t]he civilized nations of the world 
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are in virtual unanimity that statelessness is not to be imposed as punishment for crime.” The 
Canadian measure marks a return to the practice of exile. As Macklin argues, non-application to cases 
in which statelessness would result does not save it from this rap. A person may well feel a deep social 
attachment to one country while holding alternative nationalities (which themselves may be nominal). 
The denationalisation of a Canadian citizen long-resident in Canada will feel like banishment even as 
he holds another nationality, especially to the extent the latter is attenuated.  
Finally, the protective rationale for terrorist expatriation makes little sense as a practical matter. 
The “foreign fighter” problem is largely framed as a problem of return. Citizens radicalised by their 
experience in Iraq and Syria with brutal ISIL forces will return to their home countries in the West to 
undertake terror attacks. It’s a potent narrative of weaponised citizens. Without citizenship, these 
individuals would have no right of re-entry, thus defusing their utility as ISIL operatives.  
Or so our politicians would have it. In practice, denationalisation adds little counter-terror value. 
You can’t take away someone’s citizenship for being associated with ISIL before you know that he’s 
associated with ISIL. But once the security apparatus is aware of the connection, it will have other, 
standard counter-terror tools to protect against the threat. There will be the possibility of criminal 
prosecution in many states on material support charges, with incarceration on conviction. (Canada’s 
punitive scheme can hardly sustain even the pretence of a protective rationale.) Short of prosecution, 
watch lists and well-practiced surveillance techniques should prevent returning foreign fighters from 
undertaking terror attacks. Passport revocation and travel bans will help prevent citizens from 
becoming foreign fighters in the first place.  
So terrorist expatriation advances counter-terror efforts not at all. It supplies yet another example of 
security-related theatre, a feel-good move that will be popular with some voters. (The features are 
shared with some Western responses to the vastly exaggerated Ebola threat, where politicians must be 
seen to respond dramatically even if dramatic moves make no sense in policy terms.) Terrorist 
expatriation is unlikely to have staying power against a powerful human rights critique. The UK and 
Canadian measures may well fall to legal challenges, domestic or international. Even if they are 
sustained in court, they are unlikely to be put to broad use. Few other states will follow suit (it is 
interesting that terrorist expatriation has almost no political traction in the United States, its aggressive 
counter-terror posturing notwithstanding). The failure will evidence an emerging norm against 
involuntary expatriation. If states can’t make expatriation stick here, they won’t be able to make it 
stick anywhere.  
 9 
Should those who attack the nation have an absolute right to remain its citizens? 
Peter H. Schuck* 
Audrey Macklin’s call for the banishment of banishment is eloquent and persuasive on many points. 
She is surely right that particular denationalisation regimes may suffer from a variety of fatal defects. 
The standards for revocation may be too vague to constrain official discretion or to provide adequate 
notice to the citizen concerning what conduct will risk revocation. Most important, the grounds for 
revocation must be limited to only the most extreme, unmitigated attacks on the nation’s security, 
attacks that are consistent only with a desire to bring the nation to ruin. This conduct must be 
scrupulously-defined and highly specific conduct; mere malignant thoughts will not suffice. 
Revocation cannot be permitted to lead to statelessness and thus a loss of the “meta-right” (as Macklin 
puts it) to have rights, especially the right to the territorial presence that in turn confers a broad 
panoply of liberal rights. The procedures for revocation must be robust in all respects, including of 
course the right to be actually or virtually present rather than having to contest the government’s 
action from exile. The government’s burden and standard of proof must be exceedingly demanding, 
perhaps even the proof beyond a reasonable doubt required for criminal convictions.  
But even these extraordinarily demanding and rare preconditions are irrelevant to Macklin; she is 
utterly categorical in her rejection of the very notion of denationalisation. She would preclude 
denationalisation even if these (and other) strict conditions were met; indeed, no protections for the 
individual citizen – or for the threatened nation – would suffice. Here is where we disagree. I see no 
reason in logic or justice why a state should be powerless to protect itself and its people from 
imminent, existential threats (suitably defined) from an individual who has launched a dangerous 
attack (suitably defined and rigorously proved) on itself and its people. And I see no reason in logic or 
justice why that state cannot defend itself and its people against such an attack by, among other things, 
severing the attacker’s connection to a state with which he is manifestly at war, thereby making it 
much more difficult for him to succeed in that war. Should the individual’s interest in maintaining that 
connection, which (by my definition, embedded in the preconditions listed above) can only be tactical 
and cynical, utterly and categorically outweigh the nation’s interest in protecting those for whom it 
bears a sacred trust? This question, I submit, answers itself – and the answer is grounded not merely in 
a utilitarian balancing but in a deontological principle: the nation’s fundamental duty to protect its 
people. 
I also have some reservations about a few of Macklin’s other, less fundamental arguments. First, 
she claims that denationalisation weakens citizenship by eliminating its security and thus rendering it a 
form of mere legal residence. I don’t understand her logic. Am I less secure in my citizenship if I 
know that the state may execute me or imprison me for life if I murder a fellow citizen? I suppose that 
I am less secure, but that insecurity is warranted and I can easily avoid it. Moreover, there is a sense in 
which denationalising one who has demonstrably satisfied the exceedingly demanding conditions for 
revocation that I have specified does, contrary to Macklin’s claim, strengthen citizenship by 
reaffirming the conditions on which it is based.  
Second, she categorically condemns revocation in part because it categorically denies the 
individual the opportunity to rehabilitate himself. We should and ordinarily do protect a wrongdoer’s 
opportunity to rehabilitate himself, but there are many situations in which we don’t. An employer who 
catches an employee embezzling from the company may fire him without giving him an opportunity to 
rehabilitate himself there; if he wishes to rehabilitate himself, he will have to do so elsewhere, on his 
own time. When we sentence a murderer to life imprisonment without parole, we are denying him the 
right to regain his freedom through rehabilitation.  
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Third, it is true that denationalising a dual citizen would still leave him with a state while 
denationalising a mono citizen would not. But so long as we do not allow revocations that would 
render one stateless, this particular inequality between categories of citizens is hardly one that should 
trouble us – any more than we should be troubled that a dual citizen has an additional passport and can 
vote in an additional polity.  
Finally, Macklin states that there is no evidence that denationalisation will deter a would-be 
terrorist if other, more conventional counter-terrorism measures fail to do so. I agree, but so what? 
Deterrence may be an important reason to punish wrongdoers but it is by no means the only reason to 
do so. If we are justified in punishing them, that justification is not nullified by a claim that the 
punishment will not deter others. And if more conventional measures are indeed effective in 
eliminating threats, they should of course be our first and perhaps final resort. In such situations, 
denationalisation may well be a superfluous, unnecessary remedy. But this is a question of policy and 
prudence, not moral principle.  
Macklin is certainly right to worry about the possible abuses of denationalisation. The history of 
political banishment is hardly reassuring on this point. But a liberal constitutional regime can control 
such abuses by scrupulously controlling the state’s exercise of this power through a variety of familiar 
institutions and practices. These include a careful definition and exacting limitation of the grounds for 
revocation; demanding procedural and evidentiary requirements before such a power can be exercised; 
and an independent judiciary accustomed to challenging state power in the name of protecting 
individual rights. We have entrusted our precious liberties to the faithful working through of these 
institutions and practices. Some of these liberties are even more precious than our right to retain our 
citizenship when we have knowingly acted in horrendous ways that make it justifiable, under the 
safeguards I have described, for the state to declare that status forfeited. 
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Terrorists repudiate their own citizenship 
Christian Joppke*  
The recent trend to strip international terrorists of their citizenship raises general questions about the 
changing nature of terror and of citizenship. Let us start with “terror”. In the era of Marxist-inspired 
violence against the state (or rather “capitalism”, of which the state was suspected to be merely a 
servant), terror was a purely domestic affair, committed by the flower children of the elite, particularly 
its most educated and morally minded. No one would have fathomed stripping an Ulrike Meinhof or 
Andreas Baader, leaders of the 1970s' German Red Army Faction (RAF), of their German citizenship. 
The current “return of banishment” is a response to an altogether different type of terror, one that 
transcends borders and is committed by people who explicitly posit themselves outside the political 
community of the nation-state—allegiance to the community of believers (ummah) cancels out the 
secular community of citizens, it is even deliberately mobilised against the latter. Only notice the 
cynical ritual of the Islamic State`s henchmen to have a fellow-national do the mediatised head-
chopping. By the same token, RAF limited its murderous acts to high-ranking representatives of the 
“system” (of which ordinary citizens were seen as merely victims who thus stood to be recruited as 
fellow-fighters). Al Qaeda and its Islamic State sequel seek death for ordinary citizens, whose 
humanity is denied through being demoted to “unbelievers”. Paul Kahn took the ubiquitous threat of 
terror to be today`s ultimate moment of citizenship, the “moment of conscription”.1 
Indeed, Islamic terror is meant to be “war”, while RAF aspired to “revolution” – two very different 
things, with obvious implications for citizenship in the former but not the latter. That terror against 
citizens should lead to reconsidering the citizen status of its culprits, who proved the ties to their state 
of citizenship to be at best “tactical and cynical”, as Peter Schuck writes in his contribution, seems 
logical. One is therefore astounded about the measured response by Western states, which have mostly 
respected the international norm of avoiding statelessness (only lately, in response to the unspeakable 
atrocities committed by the fighters of the Islamic State, have there been cracks in this commitment, 
most notably in Britain). But academics cry out that “banishment weakens citizenship”, as Audrey 
Macklin does. They draw an idyllic and reality-resistant picture of “singular and unique” ties between 
terrorists and the citizenship they despise; “intrinsically grave harm” is said to be inflicted here, 
separate even from “the harm of statelessness” (ibid.). Evidently, more sympathy is invested on the 
culprits than on their victims. 
Make no mistake. One should hold no illusion about populist, spin-doctored politicians, from 
Britain to America, Norway to Italy, who hide their chronic incapacity to lead in our contemporary 
“audience democracies” behind the sable-rattling “security” and “War on Terror” rhetoric that the 
people wish to hear.
2
 Macklin has a point when she finds that under the guise of “security” only “the 
discretionary and arbitrary power of the executive” is increased. Particularly the recent experience in 
Britain under Tory Home Minister Theresa May, with a rather capricious practice of citizenship 
stripping for the loosely defined reason of being “conducive to the public good”, with sometimes 
lethal and conspiratorially concocted consequences for the targeted individuals, lends itself to this 
interpretation. And Peter Spiro is on target that conducting the fight against terrorism on the 
citizenship front is “empty gestures” and not likely to have much effect – though his proposal of 
“passport revocation and travel bans” in lieu of denationalisation reads eerily off the mark after the 
recent tragedy of a would-be jihadist, who had been grounded by the Canadian government exactly in 
these terms, turning his rage about the passport denial against an innocent guardsman in Ottawa. 
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The practical question of effectiveness is secondary to the principled question whether citizenship 
for proven (naturally not just suspected or potential) terrorists who conduct war (in the literal sense) 
against Western states and their citizens should be unassailable. At heart, the issue is one of “loyalty 
and allegiance”, as the Canadian Immigration Minister, Chris Alexander, defended the 2014 
Strengthening Canadian Citizenship Act in parliament. This act, representative of similar bills 
currently being considered in a number of European states, Australia, and the United States, allows the 
stripping of citizenship in the cases of treason, spying, taking up arms against the Canadian Forces, 
and terrorism, even if the latter is committed outside Canada and sentenced by foreign courts, should 
the action in question constitute a terrorism offence also under Canadian law. The expanded 
geographic scope for terrorism, which stirred controversy, was clearly dictated by heightened security 
concerns. But it also recognises the global nature of the new terror and its affront to the secular state 
and citizenship at large, wherever it may occur; one might read it as a comity of nations response to a 
global challenge. In any case, it is not just bizarre but self-destructive to measure the “strength” of 
citizenship in terrorists' unencumbered possibility to make tactical use of it in their war against the 
godless state and its unbelieving median citizen. 
For calibrating banishment, next to taking into account the changing nature of terror, one also 
needs to recognise the changing nature of citizenship in a globalising world. Whoever has reflected for 
a second on the colossal injustice inflicted on the vast majority of mankind by being born into the 
“wrong” kind of state that cannot guarantee its “citizens” physical safety and the elementary means of 
survival
3
, must be irritated to see citizenship depicted as something that an individual should never be 
able to lose, however randomly it had been assigned to her in the first place, and however much a 
particular individual has done to undermine or even destroy this very citizenship (and the state that 
guarantees it). Audrey Macklin sees the danger of banishment in “making legal citizenship contingent 
on performance”. “Performance” strikes me as a rather vague and anodyne term for the behavior in 
question. It is one thing to make citizenship acquisition contingent on virtuous behaviour, which could 
never be exacted on born citizens (as Britain entertained for a while in its “probationary” or “earned” 
citizenship scheme that was never implemented); it is quite another to make a declared war against the 
secular state and its citizens a ground for renunciation. As much as one should eschew virtuous 
citizenship from a liberal perspective, one should welcome, even require the withdrawing of 
citizenship from someone to whom it is at best a tactical weapon. 
It may warm the heart to elevate citizenship to a “right to have rights”, enunciated by US Supreme 
Court Chief Justice Earl Warren in a different time and context (voting in foreign elections
4
 and 
desertion during World II
5
, in both cases without any third-party harm inflicted and at best a vague and 
constructed violation of allegiance). The gospel of citizenship stripping as “cruel punishment”, 
pronounced in Trop v. Dulles (1958), needs reconsideration in the age of global terror. And the 
accompanying formula of citizenship as a “right to have rights” obscures that persons without states or 
citizenship are no longer the “scum of the earth” they may have been in the late 1940s, when Hannah 
Arendt wrote the Origins of Totalitarianism. But most importantly, the formula “rights to have rights” 
dodges the fact that, indeed, citizenship in a globalising world is increasingly “privilege” and 
“contract”. It is a privilege if one considers the mentioned exclusion from a lucrative OECD-state 
citizenship of most of mankind (that has to make do with less than US$ 2 per day). And it is a contract 
by definition for the ever growing number of immigrants who are not born with it but seek it out for 
their own benefit. In the post-feudal world, most states allow the possibility to renounce one`s 
citizenship—this was the point of departure of “democratic” America from “monarchical” Britain. But 
then it is not outlandish (or illiberal) to concede the converse capacity to states to rid themselves even 
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of born citizens who have despised or patently abused their citizenship through their actions (and why 
stop at the threshold of statelessness?). 
Macklin claims that banishment is “both superfluous and anachronistic” because states now have 
“criminal justice systems” at their disposal to “rehabilitate and reintegrate wrongdoers within the 
state”. This claim is misleading and paternalistic. International terrorists are not criminals but 
warriors—they don`t want to be “reintegrated”. The liberal state should acknowledge their claim, eye 
to eye, by taking away from them what they have factually renounced and even wish to destroy. 
Canadian minister Chris Alexander is right: “They (terrorists) will have, in effect, withdrawn their 
allegiance to Canada by their very actions.” Peter Spiro lawyerly ups the ante by arguing that there 
could not be a “shift of loyalty” on the part of Islamic terrorists because “there is no citizenship in the 
Islamic State”. Does he want to wait until they have acquired a seat in the United Nations? 
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It’s not about their citizenship, it’s about ours 
Vesco Paskalev* 
The very passion and fury pouring from Christian Joppke’s contribution should prompt both the 
lawyer and the political philosopher that he is wrong. I too am outraged by what ISIS fighters are 
doing, but it is well known that the function of constitutional rights, and of the constitutions 
themselves, is precisely to assure that the legislator is not driven by the passion of the day. One decade 
after 9/11 we know that the actions taken both by the President and the Congress of the US, based on 
the rationale that it is a new world that we have woken up into, were not all reasonable, to put it 
mildly. So may be today’s rush to strip terrorist suspects of their citizenship. When watching the daily 
news on TV, one is easily tempted to think that we are living in extraordinarily dangerous times, 
which warrant a return to what the US Supreme Court considered to be ‘cruel punishment’ half a 
century ago. Yet as a matter of statistics, and despite our contrary impressions, violence of all kinds in 
the world is actually declining.
1
 On the other hand, the capacity of law enforcement agencies for 
surveillance and control, especially in the OECD countries, has increased dramatically, so the return to 
practices which have long been abandoned is difficult to justify. This is not to say that that citizenship 
is a sacred cow and any return to abandoned practices is excluded by some historic laws of human 
progress. Nothing can be further from the truth. But it does follow that the proponents of banishment 
must provide a more subtle justification than we have seen so far. 
Joppke has a point when distinguishing the old school revolutionaries from the contemporary 
jihadists, who conceive of themselves as members of the global ummah, and not of any state. (Do we 
know that for sure? ISIS aims to create an Islamic state after all). He also has a point that waging war 
against a country is a good reason to strip the warrior of the citizenship of that country. I can accept 
even stretching this argument to apply to all those who take up arms against any allies of that country, 
or even to those who have taken arms against the international system of states. This would bring me 
already quite close to the position of the ‘deprivationists’. 
What I find difficult to accept is the unquestioned assumption that this gesture would serve any of 
the goals Joppke, and the politicians favouring banishment, may have. If the jihadists were as 
cosmopolitan as he takes them to be, deprivation would not have any meaning, neither for the actual 
fighters, nor for any like-minded followers. It might be the case that taking their passport will have the 
practical effect of preventing them from travelling to Syria or back, but as a person who is genuinely 
outraged by their deeds, I would rather see them locked up in prison rather than left at large in a legal 
limbo in the Middle East out of all places. For Joppke the practical side is only of secondary concern, 
but I am afraid his theoretical argument is self-defeating. 
Now, if we accept that the jihadists just do not care if they are deprived of their western 
citizenships, let us consider whether this would still matter for anyone else. On the one hand, there are 
the ’normal’ citizens of the same country who may wish to see the extremists publicly 
excommunicated. This is a legitimate concern. However, it is in no way different from the desire of 
many law-abiding citizens to see murderers and rapists sent to the electric chair. So the usual 
objections to the latter punishments apply here too. More importantly, while there is some 
commensurability between a murder and a death sentence, the very gravity of the offences of the 
jihadists make citizenship deprivation superfluous. Ironically, not the cruelty of citizenship 
deprivation, but its softness make it appear quite inappropriate for the case of terrorists. If we take into 
account also the practical difficulties arising in the prosecution of a foreigner, on balance it might be 
better to keep him as a citizen. On the other hand, the possibility or impossibility of revocation defines 
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and redefines the meaning of the concept of citizenship itself – of our citizenship, not of theirs. That is 
why many academics, whose professional duty is to care for precisely such nuance, are so uneasy 
about the recent trend. I would be glad if this concern remains confined to the ivory towers of the 
academia, but I suspect that the conditionality of citizenship is more than a theoretical concern for 
those citizens who are not white, Anglo-Saxon and Christian and have only recently arrived from the 
wrong side of the OECD border. 
One may argue, as Peter Schuck does, for deprivation administered under narrowly circumscribed 
conditions. Indeed, due process can alleviate some of the anxieties the conditionality of citizenship 
would create, but he does not provide much of a justification for this conditionality in the first place. 
He also relies on the intuitive, yet questionable assumption that citizenship deprivation serves to 
protect the state and its people. But all grounds for deprivation he suggests already constitute a serious 
crime, and if the perpetrator must be convicted to be denationalised as he suggests, then again, what 
difference would it make if he is a citizen or not? If deprivation were administered properly – for 
grave crimes and with due process, it becomes redundant.  
Beyond these conceptual concerns, and paying due consideration to the all too present terrorist 
threats, I want the Islamic State bombed out of existence, and I want all jihadists punished for what 
they do. But as a citizen I also want my tax money spent on police to put the bad apples in jail, not on 
border patrols to keep them out. 
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You can't lose what you haven't got: citizenship acquisition and loss in Africa 
Bronwen Manby* 
The heading for this discussion makes a person focused on sub-Saharan Africa scratch her head 
somewhat. Which ‘new’ denationalisation policies are we talking about? In Africa, we have continued 
to see the same old denationalisation policies that have been in place since the 1960s. The context of 
national security has changed in some countries, especially the threat of 21
st
 century terrorism methods 
in places such as Kenya or Nigeria, but the methods used by the governments in response have not 
changed 
The legal provisions 
If we start from a survey of the laws, most African countries allow for deprivation of nationality 
acquired by naturalisation, some of them on quite vague and arbitrary grounds. The former British 
colonies borrow language from the British precedents and provide for deprivation on the grounds of 
“disloyalty” or the “public good”; while the francophone countries talk about behaviour “incompatible 
with the status of a national” or “prejudicial to the interests of the country”. However, more than half 
of Africa’s 54 states forbid deprivation of nationality from a national from birth (of origin, in the civil 
law terminology), whether or not the person would become stateless.
1
 And although a large number of 
the remaining countries have a provision framed along the lines provided in the 1961 Convention on 
the Reduction of Statelessness for a person who works for a foreign state in defiance of an express 
prohibition to lose their nationality,
2
 only a small handful provide for deprivation of a birthright citizen 
in case of a crime against the state — Egypt, Eritrea and Mali.3  
None of the sub-Saharan countries come close to the extremes of Egypt, where citizenship can be 
deprived from anyone (citizen from birth or by naturalisation) if, among other things, “at any time he 
has been qualified as Zionist”.4  
On the positive side, the South African and Ethiopian constitutions provide blanket prohibitions on 
deprivation of nationality, whether from birth or naturalised (though South Africa then goes on to 
violate this prohibition in its legislation).
5
 Several constitutions and laws create serious due process 
hurdles for governments seeking to revoke citizenship. In Kenya for example, the 2010 constitution 
requires a naturalised citizen (citizenship by birth cannot be revoked) to have been actually convicted 
of a serious crime, including treason;
6
 less specifically, Burundi, Malawi, and Rwanda have 
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constitutional provisions forbidding arbitrary deprivation of nationality.
7
 Meanwhile, Gambia, Ghana, 
Liberia and Rwanda all provide that deprivation can only be done by a court, on the government’s 
application;
8
 and a majority, though not all, others provide for judicial review of administrative 
decisions to deprive.
9
 A few countries provide for protection against statelessness in deprivation cases: 
just Lesotho, Mauritius, and Zimbabwe (since 2013) provide in principle for protection from 
statelessness in all cases where nationality is revoked by act of the government; and Namibia, 
Rwanda, Senegal and South Africa provide partial protection, allowing statelessness to result in some 
circumstances.
10
 
On the negative side, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Seychelles, Tanzania, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe — notably, all with a British legal inheritance — explicitly state in their legislation that the 
decision of the minister on any matter under the nationality law cannot be reviewed in court.
11
 These 
are all countries which do not allow for deprivation of birthright citizenship (though some provide for 
loss in case of acquisition of another nationality); but it’s questionable what the protection against 
statelessness in deprivation cases provided by Mauritius means, if the decision of the minister cannot 
be challenged. In Swaziland, where a certificate of nationality “shall” be issued by the minister to a 
person who is qualified to be a citizen, it is also provided that the minister “may revoke” a certificate 
and no grounds are specified.
12
 Namibia allows deprivation of nationality on the grounds that a person 
was already deprived in another country, increasing the likelihood of rendering them stateless.
13
  
In 2013, the Seychelles inserted a new article to its citizenship law expanding the grounds for 
deprivation of citizenship if the minister “is satisfied” that the person has been involved in terrorism, 
piracy, drugs offences, treason, and other offences, or has acted with disloyalty.
14
 In 2010, the South 
African Citizenship Act was amended, providing for automatic loss of citizenship by a naturalised 
citizen “if he or she engages, under the flag of another country, in a war that the Republic does not 
support”, leaving lawyers wondering how you would know whether or not the Republic “supported” a 
particular war (and would it matter which side the person was on?).
15
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The practice 
But this review of deprivation provisions has a slightly unreal feel. These procedures are hardly used, 
so far as one can tell. Only South Africa publishes any statistics – or at least it used to do so – 
revealing that at least 17 people have been deprived of citizenship since 2001-02 (despite the 
constitutional ban on deprivation), though no details are given. Countries such as Kenya and Nigeria, 
both facing well-publicised and serious security threats from the Al-Qaeda-affiliated Al-Shabaab and 
Boko Haram are not known to have deprived any individual of citizenship through the formal 
procedures of the law on deprivation.
16
 
The legal provisions on deprivation of citizenship are, in fact, more or less irrelevant in countries 
where (a) as described above, citizens from birth cannot be deprived of citizenship under law except in 
the rather rare circumstance of working for another state despite a formal request not to do so; (b) 
naturalisation is very difficult to obtain; and (c) the government has easily accessible other means of 
achieving the same result in relation to (people who believed they were) birthright citizens, obviating 
any need to amend the law on withdrawal of nationality. 
As regards (b), statistics on naturalisation are hard to come by, but it seems that only a handful of 
people a year may be naturalised in most countries – even in Nigeria, with more than 150 million 
people, only around a hundred people acquire nationality by naturalisation or marriage annually – and 
those who are naturalised are mostly non-Africans operating in the formal economy, with all the 
panoply of lawyers and documents to support their claim.
17
 So few people are involved, and the 
procedures for obtaining naturalisation are so highly discretionary, that it seems unlikely that anyone 
who has the slightest possibility of becoming a threat to the security of the state could pass that barrier 
— and therefore be at risk of subsequent deprivation. It’s not impossible of course; but very unlikely. 
South Africa has had much more accessible naturalisation procedures, rendering it perhaps more 
vulnerable in this regard; but the numbers have dropped dramatically in recent years, without 
explanation. 
Therefore, (c) comes into play. The methods traditionally used in Africa to “denationalise” a person 
are simply to deny that he or she ever had nationality to start off with; to argue that the nationality 
documentation previously held was issued in error, or to fail to issue or renew a document providing 
proof of nationality (not even requiring an allegation of fraud). The key amendments to nationality 
laws in Africa have not been to increase government powers to deprive, but to restrict access to 
nationality based on birth and residence and to exploit any ambiguity in the rules applied on 
succession of states at independence.
18
 These are the methods used against some high profile 
individuals: Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia and Alassane Ouattara of Côte d’Ivoire most famously; but 
also John Modise of Botswana, who found himself no longer considered a national by birth when he 
set up a political party in order to run for president. These cases reached the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, but there are many others litigated only at national level involving 
politicians, journalists or activists. 
UNHCR’s clear guidance is that a retrospective finding that a person was not a national and was 
issued nationality documents in error is just as subject to rules on arbitrariness as any procedure under 
formal provisions on deprivation.
19
 However, under national law, why bother with deprivation 
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proceedings if you can manage matters so much more easily by other methods? And this applies 
especially when whole categories of people are seen as problematic, or potentially so. 
It is, in fact, not the individual difficult cases that raise the greatest concerns in the African context, 
but the tendency to attribute collective responsibility to whole groups of citizens when a country is 
faced with a (real or perceived) security threat – or simply an organised opposition with support from 
a particular ethnic group. Faced with the challenges of “nation-building” in states created by colonial 
fiat, the question of who belongs is not necessarily an obvious one to answer. African states have a 
history of mass expulsions based on ethnic grounds — there is even a style of bag known in Nigeria as 
a “Ghana Must Go” bag, dating to one such episode in the 1980s when (actual or alleged) Ghanaians 
had to pack up and leave — and it remains the case that the usual approach is to assert that someone is 
a non-national, and then expel them.
20
 The prevalence of such practices led to the inclusion of a 
specific provision banning mass expulsions, not found among similar treaties, in the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights.21 Even where those who have been expelled fail to find recognition in 
their alleged country of origin, they may be unable to reclaim their status in the former country of 
residence: among those persons of Eritrean origin who were expelled by Ethiopia to Eritrea during the 
1998 war between the two countries, a number subsequently became refugees from the highly 
repressive Eritrean regime. Even in their case, when some applied for reacquisition of Ethiopian 
nationality, they were reportedly told that they were security risks, so could not get papers.
22
 
In Kenya, discriminatory measures in relation to documentation and identity have been sharply 
stepped up against Kenyan Somalis and coastal Muslims, tarred with the brush of the Westgate Mall 
siege and other outrages. In addition to a general round up and detention of suspected youth, the 
issuance of national ID cards has been suspended in the three counties that are located in the former 
North Eastern Province bordering Somalia (Garissa, Wajir and Mandera Counties, created by the 2010 
Constitution), meaning that those without IDs cannot travel out of that zone, and effectively lose the 
reality of citizenship rights — without the need for the government to undertake any bothersome legal 
proceedings.
23
 In Nigeria, the peculiar features of the country’s federal system have led to the 
possibility of “denationalisation” from a particular part of the country, even though such measures 
haven’t been taken at national level. In the context of the threat from Boko Haram, governors of states 
in the south-east of the country in 2014 stepped up long-standing discrimination based on the idea of 
“indigeneity” to adopt controversial measures to register and possibly deport “non-indigenes”, leading 
to an emergency meeting of the National Council of State in July 2014 to condemn these practices (but 
no action beyond establishing a committee to make recommendations).
24 Ghana’s consul-general in 
Nigeria indeed recently blamed the Boko Haram insurgency on “stateless people” excluded from the 
benefits of citizenship, and urged efforts to strengthen documentation across the sub-region.
25
 
There are the beginnings of recognition that stronger guarantees around the right to a nationality 
may be part of the solution to some of the security challenges in the continent. The African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights is working with the AU Commission in Addis Ababa to 
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draft a protocol to the African Charter on the right to a nationality.
26
 The African Committee of 
Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child recently adopted a General Comment on the rights of 
children to a name, birth registration and a nationality.
27
 In parallel, there is a major push to improve 
documentation through the initiation or strengthening of requirements to hold a national identity card, 
for civil registration in general, and for the use of biometric data in these documents. But this push on 
information technology carries significant risks that governments will seek only to police the 
boundaries of their systems, excluding anyone of “doubtful” nationality, while failing to reform legal 
provisions and administrative practices that restrict access to nationality for those who constitute no 
security threat at all. To date, the international agencies responsible on these issues — especially 
UNHCR, UNICEF and IOM — are also failing to join up the dots with a coherent approach on 
nationality and documentation in their interventions with national governments. Given the very real 
security threats they face, it remains an open question whether governments such as Nigeria’s and 
Kenya’s will commit to more secure rights to citizenship, rather than only more secure documentation.  
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Revocation of citizenship of terrorists: a matter of political expediency 
Kay Hailbronner* 
Let’s be clear: We are not in a dispute about the use of denationalisation policies to get rid of 
unwanted citizens who do not comply with a code of conduct how to behave as a “good” or “loyal” 
citizen. Nor are we talking about deprivation or revocation of citizenship on account of race, political 
opinion, religion, descent etc. There are clear rules of public international law prohibiting 
discriminatory citizenship policies and none of the policies discussed here call these into question. 
What we are discussing is the different and by no means absolutely novel issue of revoking the 
citizenship of persons who have given up or are irrefutably considered as having renounced that basic 
attachment which distinguishes citizenship from a residence permit. A recent report of de Groot and 
Vink for the European Commission lists voluntary military service and non-military public service in 
nine, and eight EU countries respectively as a ground for revocation of citizenship, subject of course to 
some restrictions (prevention of statelessness) and exceptions. 
In around half of the 28 countries included in the study, seriously prejudicial behaviour is 
considered as a ground for revocation of citizenship. The European Convention on Nationality of 6 
November1997 provides for revocation of citizenship for conduct seriously prejudicial to the vital 
interests of the State party ( Art.7 para 1 lit.d). Very similar provisions on revocation are laid down in 
Art. 8 para 3 of the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness of 1961. 
What is new is the inclusion of a specific type of seriously prejudicial behaviour which is 
considered as endangering the safety of the population of a state and its security into this catalogue. 
The actors are not totalitarian or authoritarian regimes but democratic states with well-established 
institutions to protect human rights and to ensure the rule of law. Not that the democratic character of 
the states in question would dispense us from closely watching the transfer and exercise of powers to 
the executive branch, particularly in such a rights-sensitive area as denationalisation policies. 
Safeguards against arbitrary actions and abuse of power, conditions and procedures must be 
predominant on the watch list, as Peter Schuck rightly emphasizes. But why should revocation of 
citizenship of terrorists result inevitably in arbitrary and abusive exercise of power, as Audrey Macklin 
assumes? 
What makes international terrorism so distinctive is not only its criminal and administrative 
relevance, but also its relevance for discontinuance of that special relationship established by 
citizenship. In order to answer this question it is not sufficient to conjure up emphatically the 
uniqueness of the ties between a citizen and a state. It is true that citizenship establishes a special 
relationship based upon security and stability. Security and stability on the side of the individual 
citizen require that denationalisation remains a rare exception. Citizenship implies rights, whether it is 
designated as a privilege, as a right to have rights or as a contract. For that reason deprivation of 
citizenship requires an overriding public interest and is subject to proportionality. 
Ordinary crimes, even of a serious nature, have not been considered as sufficient under Art. 7 of the 
European Convention to destroy the bond of citizenship. Yet, fundamental and persistent alienation 
from the nation as a political community has – in spite of divergent interpretations and applications – 
frequently been considered as a justification for revocation of citizenship. Democratic states in the 
defence of their constitutional order and protection of the safety of their population and the security of 
the state are not restricted to a regime of criminal and administrative sanctions if their own nationals 
turn against them. 
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Legal comparison shows that there is no uniformity. States, according to their particular political 
conditions, and history that is sometimes reflected in constitutional provisions, have largely prohibited 
involuntary revocation of citizenship. Germany is one example, though it provides for loss of 
citizenship for voluntary service in foreign military services or in case of voluntary acquisition of a 
foreign citizenship. Other states, like Britain, have applied the concept to high treason, espionage, etc. 
International treaties, like the European Convention on Nationality of 1997 or the Convention on the 
Reduction of Statelessness provide further barriers. States may not provide for the loss of nationality if 
the person concerned would become stateless (except in case of fraud). One could discuss what this 
means if a state’s national joins a group or organisation, such as the “Islamic State”, which is 
dominating a state-like territory and exercises state-like authority. 
Discussion of the international and constitutional law prerequisites of revocation of citizenship is 
not the concern of Audrey Macklin. She argues primarily with illegitimacy. As a lawyer I have some 
difficulty with this term. If it is not illegal, what are the criteria for illegitimacy or immorality? Her 
personal idea of how democratic states should behave? That of course may be an acceptable political 
reasoning, provided I learn more about its ideological premises which I may share or not. I do 
understand Peter Spiro’s objection about the revocation of citizenship as a” security theatre” although 
I feel not confident on the basis of the facts to judge whether it is true that revocation of citizenship for 
international terrorists is impractical and irrelevant. The arguments of illegitimacy, in my view are 
hardly convincing. Assuming that revocation of citizenship is a (prohibited) form of punishment 
simply ignores the legal nature of revocation of citizenship. It is not destined to sanction acts of 
international terrorism, in addition to a potential criminal or administrative sanction. By untying the 
bond of citizenship, the former citizen can no longer rely upon his/her citizenship for unlimited entry 
and residence and free international travel. The further argument that there is no chance of 
rehabilitation is based on the same misunderstanding of revocation of citizenship as a special form of 
punishment. Citizenship of such persons is revoked because they have given up their attachment to a 
community by attacking the very fundament of that community, not by merely violating its internal 
rules of public order. To talk in this context of an inalienable right of rehabilitation, distorts the 
purpose of citizenship revocation. 
The hard questions arise with the formulation of a precise and judicially reviewable provision 
authorising the executive to revoke citizenship. International terrorism as such is a term open to 
divergent interpretations. We do, however, have quite some experience, based upon the jurisprudence 
of national and international courts and Security Council Resolutions, in defining international 
terrorism. In order to be effective, a provision must include such actions as joining extremist 
organisations for training in order to use such training for participation in terrorist activities, as well as 
a membership in an organisation destined to fight against the state whose citizenship the person 
concerned possesses. 
A further question is whether the introduction of a new provision on revocation of citizenship 
serves a useful purpose. Utility cannot be denied by reference to criminal law. It goes without saying 
that acts of international terrorism should be punished and that administrative action should, where 
possible, be taken to limit the use of passports for international travel for the purpose of preparing or 
assisting international terrorism – the technical and cynical use of citizenship rights, as Peter Schuck 
has phrased it. Criminal and administrative sanctions are always attached to specific activities. They 
do not cover the aspect of using citizenship in a general and in principle unforeseeable manner for acts 
destined to endanger the security of the state of which the perpetrators are citizens. 
The cosmopolitan nature of this type of terrorism, as Christian Joppke has aptly described it, is 
misunderstood by Vesco Paskalev when he argues that the jihadists do not care about their citizenship. 
They might indeed not care about their attachment to the state whose citizenship they posses but they 
do care about the possibilities that a Canadian, US, British or German passport conveys with visa-free 
international travel, free entry and residence in their “home” country and diplomatic protection if 
something does not go quite as smoothly as expected. 
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Revocation of citizenship means a substantial interference with individual rights. It can only be 
justified if tightly defined material conditions in accordance with the constitutional law of each 
country and its international commitments are fulfilled. Risk assessment and proof of an affiliation, 
assistance or membership in an international terrorist organisation will be essential elements in this 
procedure. Whether there is a practical value in revocation of citizenship for citizens engaged in 
international terrorism in addition to criminal and administrative sanctions is within the framework of 
law a matter of political expediency which may well lead to different results in different countries. 
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Whose bad guys are terrorists? 
Rainer Bauböck* 
Peter Schuck, Christian Joppke and Kay Hailbronner have provided strong arguments why liberal 
democracies should have the power to strip terrorist suspects of their citizenship. As good lawyers, 
Schuck and Hailbronner add that such power must be exercised with restraint and hedged in by the 
rule of law. 
Everybody in this debate agrees that terrorists ought to be punished. Most would also agree that 
liberal states need exceptional powers in order to prevent terrorism and that this justifies some 
constraints on freedom of speech and association, for example by making incitement to terrorist 
violence or joining a terrorist organisation punishable crimes. 
Terrorists commit particularly evil crimes. Yet denationalisation does not look like punishment for 
these crimes. First, it is normally based on executive order rather than court judgment. Second, it does 
not meet the standard purposes for criminal punishment. It cannot be justified as retribution, since it is 
not proportionate to the monstrosity of the crime. It does not promote rehabilitation, since the effect is 
to remove the criminal from the jurisdiction. And it is not effective in deterring or preventing terrorist 
crimes, since – as Vesco Paskalev has argued global jihadists hardly care about losing citizenship 
status in a Western democracy that they detest.  
Hailbronner points out that terrorists care about losing their right to travel, but restricting their 
freedom to move can also be achieved by other means, e.g. by invalidating their passports without 
denationalising them. Banishing jihadists to exactly those states where they want to go anyway to 
commit their atrocities can hardly count as an effective strategy against global terrorism. As a political 
scientist I suspect that governments have other motives apart from policy effectiveness when they seek 
denationalisation powers. They do not only want to do something against terrorism, they also want to 
be seen by voters as doing something. Stripping terrorist suspects of their citizenship is a strongly 
visible policy and for that reason possibly also a strongly symbolic one, as suggested by Peter Spiro. 
This is not yet a conclusive refutation, since on some views it is exactly the symbolic nature of the 
sanction that justifies the denationalisation of terrorists. This argument starts from the assertion that 
liberal democracies are value-based political communities. Their basic values include freedom of 
conscience and religious practice, of speech and association and democratic self-government. Since 
these states are liberal, they cannot force their citizens to share their basic values. These are instead 
enshrined in their constitutions and their political institutions are designed to protect these values. 
Terrorists do not merely reject liberal values, they act to destroy the very institutions that protect these 
values. So why should liberal states not take away citizenship from those who attack the very 
foundations of liberal citizenship? Wouldn’t this serve to defend these states’ core values? 
The answer is that the norms guiding the acquisition and loss of citizenship status have little to do 
with either the promotion or the defence of liberal values. In all states, including liberal ones, 
citizenship is acquired automatically at birth and normally retained over a whole life. Native citizens 
are never asked to show their commitment to liberal values as a condition for retaining their 
citizenship, nor are they stripped of their status when they commit crimes. Serious criminals are 
locked up in prison and thereby stripped of many citizenship rights, most importantly that of free 
movement. In some countries they also lose – and in my view much more questionably – voting rights. 
But they do not lose their citizenship status. Citizenship in our world has an extremely sticky quality. 
It does not have an expiry date, it can be passed on to subsequent generations and it can be carried 
abroad and increasingly also exercised from outside the state territory. 
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Yet many liberal states have introduced citizenship tests or naturalisation oaths in which 
immigrants are asked to affirm their commitment to the polity and its constitution.
1
 Doesn’t this show 
that acquisition of citizenship status and therefore also its loss may depend on a commitment to liberal 
values? No, it doesn’t. Leaving aside the tricky question whether such commitments can be tested by 
filling in a questionnaire or taking an oath, naturalisation integrates newcomers into a political 
community that is based on birthright membership and equal citizenship. No matter how they have 
been selected and how they have acquired their citizenship, all citizens have equal membership status 
and those who have got it through naturalisation can retain it in the same way as if they had got it by 
birth. 
This statement needs two minor qualifications. First, if citizenship has been acquired unlawfully, 
for example through concealing a criminal record, then it may be withdrawn. This reasoning cannot be 
applied to citizens who assert their commitment to a liberal constitution in a citizenship test or loyalty 
oath that they subsequently violate. Because liberal states cannot force ordinary citizens to support 
their core values, they also cannot claim that citizenship status has been acquired unlawfully if a 
naturalisation applicant was not sincere when swearing loyalty or was sincere and subsequently 
changed his views. 
Second, the norm of equal treatment of native and naturalised citizens is not accepted by all liberal 
states – as we all know, the American President must be a native citizen. It is, however, enshrined in 
Art. 5 of the 1997 European Convention on Nationality and it is not difficult to see why unequal 
treatment of citizens based on their circumstances of birth is discriminatory and undermines the core 
value of equality. Faced with terrorism that is now no longer just imported but also home-grown, 
Western governments may anyhow be reluctant to limit the application of their denationalisation 
powers to naturalised immigrants. 
There are two closely connected reasons why citizenship status is sticky and why it should not be 
taken away even for acts that attack the foundations of the polity. The first reason has to do with the 
function of nationality in the international state system. Citizenship is a mechanism for assigning 
responsibility for individuals to states. In its 1955 Nottebohm judgment the International Court of 
Justice asserted that citizenship should be based on a genuine connection in order to prevent states 
from abusively bestowing their citizenship on individuals residing abroad who want to escape a legal 
duty towards their host country. The same genuine link argument has been invoked by the European 
Parliament and Commission against Malta in January this year as an objection against the sale of EU 
citizenship to wealthy foreigners without a residence requirement.
2
 If states can abuse their powers to 
confer citizenship by naturalising foreigners who lack a genuine connection, they can also do so by 
denationalising their citizens in order to shift responsibility for them to another state. This is exactly 
what happens when Western countries deprive terrorist suspects of their citizenship. As Audrey 
Macklin has already explained, the effects can be particularly perverse for dual citizens. Since 
deprivation does not make them stateless, each of the two states involved has an incentive to act first 
so that the other state becomes responsible. 
International law can thus not provide a full answer to our question. We must also consider what 
depriving terrorist suspects does to the citizenship bond as an internal relation between an individual 
and a state. Joppke points out that Germany did not expatriate the left wing terrorists of the Red Army 
Faction. They wanted to transform the German state whereas the global jihadists de facto renounce 
their membership by affiliating themselves with an Islamic pseudo-state. But the RAF was certainly as 
effective in shaking the foundations of a liberal Rechtsstaat by triggering illiberal responses as was Al 
                                                     
1
 See EUDO CITIZENSHIP Forum Debate 'How Liberal are Citizenship Tests?'  
2
 See the press release of EU Justice Commissioner Vivian Reding (15 January 2014), the European 
Parliament resolution of 16 January 2014 on EU Citizenship for Sale, and the EUDO CITIZENSHIP Forum 
Debate 'Should citizenship be for sale?' 
Whose bad guys are terrorists? 
29 
Qaeda when it fell the twin towers in New York – and much more so than IS, which primarily wants 
to scare Western powers out of Iraq and Syria. In any case, the question here is not whether Ulrike 
Meinhof and Andreas Baader had a moral claim to German citizenship that jihadist terrorist suspects 
do not have. The question is whether Western democracies can shed responsibility for their home-
grown citizen terrorists and shoulder it upon other states. This is what the new denationalisation 
policies are about. 
Imagine for a moment that after 1945 Germany or Austria had posthumously denationalised Adolf 
Hitler. Would this symbolic act have strengthened their post-war liberal orders by demonstrating their 
abhorrence of Hitler’s destruction of their liberal constitutions and his genocidal elimination of Jews 
and Roma from the political community? The answer is clearly no, because Hitler’s denationalisation 
would have entailed a denial of responsibility for his crimes and their consequences and would thus 
have achieved the very opposite of the intended defence of liberal values. Moreover, if either Germany 
or Austria had taken such a decision, it would have signalled that they merely wanted to pass on the 
buck to the other state. Recognising that Hitler was “our bad guy” was therefore crucial for building a 
liberal democratic consensus in both countries and good relations with other states that were the 
victims of Nazi aggression. 
Why should this be different today with the jihadist terrorists? Joppke’s answer involves an attempt 
to distinguish domestic from global terrorists. This may be often difficult, since Hitler turned out to be 
a global terrorist too. But the crucial point is that citizenship is by its very nature a domestic relation 
between an individual and a state. By cutting the bond, states deny their responsibility, including that 
towards the rest of the world upon whom they inflict the terrorist threat. 
If denationalisation were a necessary and effective tool to prevent terrorism, it might be justifiable 
on such utilitarian grounds. But as a symbolic defence of the liberal values that terrorists attack it is 
entirely unconvincing. 
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Human rights for all is better than citizenship rights for some 
Daniel Kanstroom* 
This is an exceptionally rich and challenging discussion in which I am honored to participate, though 
time and space limitations will inspire brevity. Audrey Macklin’s essay reaches two major conclusions 
with which I heartily agree:  
1. Citizenship-stripping weakens the concept of citizenship;  
2. It is of highly-questionable efficacy and legitimacy as punishment;
1
 
Despite my deep agreement with Macklin about the dangers of denationalisation trends in the UK, 
Canada, and elsewhere, I am not convinced that she has chosen the best way to counter them. In brief, 
I fear that Macklin may have missed some of the forest for the trees.  
My view of the forest is this: Denationalisation should be situated against a broader backdrop in 
which pervasive rights deprivations against noncitizens – and even such extraterritorial rights 
deprivations against citizens as drone strikes – are central components. Macklin points us in this 
direction when she distinguishes the aspirational safe harbor of citizenship from a functional 
methodology:  
“But my point is not to propose a metric capable of measuring the quantitative, qualitative, 
experiential, emotional, personal, familial, cultural, social, financial, linguistic and political 
impacts of exile on any individual, in order that some state official could determine precisely when 
citizenship revocation inflicts an appropriate versus excessive degree of punishment.”  
I fully support Macklin’s desire to enhance “the security that distinguishes legal citizenship.” I worry, 
though, about what certain approaches to such security might mean for “other statuses that define the 
relationship between state and individual.” The challenge is to protect citizenship rights without 
relegating those “other statuses” unduly tenuous and marginal.  
Put simply, I suggest that the best way to do this is less (formally) citizenship–centered and more 
(functionally) rights-centered. By “rights-centered,” I mean, essentially, a critical examination of state 
practices (including the government’s intentions and justifications, and the practices’ mechanisms, and 
effects) measured against the norms of a fully-developed human rights protection system.
2
 More 
specifically, the important legal and policy questions raised by Macklin may be best answered by 
viewing denationalisation along a continuum of state practices that use citizenship status and territorial 
formalism to achieve policy goals with weakened (and in some cases no) rule of law encumbrances. 
This is one of the great human rights legal challenges of our times. It must be engaged fully – in all of 
its manifestations – in order to be properly understood and effectively engaged.  
Macklin rightly notes that, “…citizenship revocation is best understood as a technique for 
extending the functionality of immigration law in counter-terrorism.” Moreover, “[s]ince 2001, states 
have turned to deportation to resolve threats to national security by displacing the embodied threat to 
the country of nationality.” However, the deep significance of these insights may be lost by too 
formalistic and narrow an examination of the particular practice of denationalisation. A basic reason 
for this is the powerful attraction—symbolic and practical--of citizenship as a safe harbor. That, in and 
of itself, is unobjectionable. But it risks denigration of the rights claims of noncitizens. Let me 
emphasize that I do not think that Macklin intends this at all. Still, her method may take us there.  
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Here is an example. Macklin writes, “Banishment fits the crime of disloyalty the way capital 
punishment fits the crime of murder.” This works for me passably well as analogy (though, of course, 
the “crime” of disloyalty is a much more complex proposition than murder). But the analogy prompts 
a question: How does banishment (of citizens) differ from what I have termed “post-entry social 
control deportation,” which in the U.S. has resulted in lifetime exclusion of many thousands of long-
term legal residents from their families and communities due to minor criminal offenses?
3
 Does their 
lack of citizenship status render the death penalty analogy less apt? In another passage, Macklin 
correctly worries about “arbitrary and prejudicial abuse of a discretionary power.” What do we make 
of the fact that such abuses are rare against citizens and troublingly common against noncitizens? 
Macklin is thus right, but perhaps insufficiently expansive when she asserts that the particular practice 
of denationalisation “is exile.” Is denationalisation categorically different from expulsion and removal 
of long-term legal residents because, as Macklin argues, it “extinguishes a singular right of citizenship, 
namely the right to enter and to remain”? This seems formalistic and perhaps a bit circular. A fuller 
exploration might consider the actual effects of deportation and denationalisation on people of various 
statuses, various levels of assimilation, and various fears of harm. This would help explain why the 
“right” to enter and remain is so crucial to protect against disproportionate or arbitrary state action 
against all people.  
My main concern is about the potential implications of Macklin’s methodology. The formalistic 
reification of citizenship may justify the relegation of noncitizens to a nether world of inferior 
balancing tests.
4
 This is especially the case if that reification is connected to an implicitly exclusive set 
of rights claims to enter and remain. Noncitizens have such rights, too, at least under certain 
circumstances. Insufficient attention to such rights – though they are concededly still works–in-
progress – is especially dangerous where the rights claims at issue include the right to life, to 
proportional punishment, to family unity, against arbitrary detention, and to procedural fairness.  
Let us also consider the etiology and evolution of denationalisation. Harsh expulsion and exclusion 
practices against noncitizens can provide a conceptual matrix that facilitates similar practices against 
citizens. As Thomas Jefferson – writing to oppose the Federalists’ Alien Friends Act, Alien Enemies 
Act, and Sedition Act – warned in 1798: “The friendless alien has indeed been selected as the safest 
subject of a first experiment, but the citizen will soon follow...”5 The best response to this concern, 
however, is not a regime of exclusive protections only for citizens. Rather, we should strengthen 
reasonable (procedural and substantive) human rights protections for all people, regardless of status or 
location. I expect that Macklin would not strongly disagree with this. Still, insufficient attention to 
such experiments against noncitizens have had metastatic tendencies in the past.  
Denationalisation should not be viewed as an anomalous practice that requires a unique normative 
critique grounded on a strong, formalistic conception of citizenship as the (supposed) Arendtian “right 
to have rights.” Rather, it should be viewed as the apotheosis of an evolving array of exclusion and 
removal practices, as well as the episodic search by governments for what some termed Guantánamo 
Bay: “a legal black hole.” 6 A more capacious analysis would thus not only critique the British, 
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“conducive to the public good” standard as relegating citizens to the status of permanent residents. It 
would equally question the standard’s legitimacy and propriety for the latter group.7 (Indeed, its 
attempted application to citizens might be ironically salutary, as political opposition will be more 
readily mobilised if it is practiced widely. 
Easy denationalisation deserves normative and practical critique, to be sure. As Rainer Bauböck 
properly highlights, citizenship is (and should be) “sticky” and thus denationalisation must be justified 
as punishment. This practice is ill advised, problematic, and especially difficult to justify in liberal 
democracies for the reasons he highlights. However, critique should be primarily grounded in a 
broader set of human rights norms that apply whenever a state seeks to use its power 
disproportionately or arbitrarily against anyone anywhere. This is especially important for those who 
are strongly assimilated, who would be rendered juridically or functionally stateless or who would 
face severe harm, persecution, or torture.  
In a similar vein, I would not recapitulate the rather formalistic and ultimately sterile debate 
between a “right” and a “privilege,” nor rely too readily on Justice Earl Warren’s channeling of 
Hannah Arendt. When Warren asserted that citizenship is “the right to have rights,” he was tactically 
using this phrase to justify a particular position in a dissent in a 1958 case.
8
 The case involved a U.S. 
citizen (by birth) who had lived most of his life in Texas and had voted there in 1946.
9
 The court 
narrowly upheld the denationalisation (also called “expatriation”). Justice Warren wrote a somewhat 
rambling dissent built around the (unattributed) reference to Arendt.
10
 He concluded with two 
apparently contradictory propositions. The first was seemingly absolute, if a bit puzzling: “The 
Government is without power to take citizenship away from a native-born or lawfully naturalized 
American.”11 The second conclusion focused on the intention of the citizen: “The citizen may elect to 
renounce his citizenship, and under some circumstances he may be found to have abandoned his status 
by voluntarily performing acts that compromise his undivided allegiance to his country.” Thus, even 
Justice Warren accepted that certain conduct could justify expatriation, so long as the conduct was 
voluntary.
12
 But this fits poorly with the absolutist reading of the “right to have rights.” Who would 
voluntarily relinquish the right to have all rights? 
Later U.S. cases elaborated on the criterion of voluntariness, ultimately elevating it to the dominant 
principle.
13
 However, as Justice Harlan once noted, the historical evidence limiting government power 
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to voluntary expatriation was questionable, to say the least.
14
 Harlan highlighted a more functional, 
less formalistic defense of citizenship: “Once obtained, citizenship is of course protected from 
arbitrary withdrawal by the constraints placed around Congress’ powers by the Constitution….” This 
model seems to dovetail with Peter Schuck’s proposal in this debate.15 It has the powerful virtue of 
situating denationalisation within the rubric of well-accepted protections of the rule of law. 
Finally, one should also note something obvious but worth highlighting: Hannah Arendt’s position 
was not that citizenship should be the “right to have rights.” Rather, as she expressly put it: “The 
Rights of Man, supposedly inalienable, proved to be unenforceable…whenever people appeared who 
were no longer citizens of any sovereign state.”16 (Arendt 1966: 293) Her concerns were practical: 
Such people lacked any real protection. When she explored the subject substantively her argument was 
much more nuanced: “…recent attempts to frame a new bill of human rights, which seem to have 
demonstrated that no one seems able to define with any assurance what these general human rights, as 
distinguished from the rights of citizen, really are.” (Ibid.)17 But Arendt published The Origins of 
Totalitarianism in 1951. It hardly needs to be said that—despite its evident challenges and 
deficiencies--the corpus of human rights protections is today more specific, more robust, and more 
widely enforced than was the case during the times she considered.  
Arendt also poignantly described the “calamity of the rightless” as “that they no longer belong to 
any community whatsoever.” The main reason this was a calamity was that “no law exists for them.” 
(Ibid: 295) The best way to avoid such calamities is not only to strengthen citizenship protections. 
That may well have the perverse consequences of, on the one hand, rendering citizenship ever harder 
to achieve, and on the other, relegating noncitizens to an increasingly rightless realm. We must do the 
harder, more basic work of defining and instantiating meaningful human rights protections for all 
people, regardless of status, or location. Focusing too specifically on the problem of deprivation of 
citizenship must not blind us “to the numerous small and not so small evils with which the road to hell 
is paved.”18 
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Denationalisation, assassination, territory: Some (U.S.-prompted) reflections 
Linda Bosniak* 
Unlike the several liberal states Macklin cites which have already, or will soon, deploy citizenship 
revocation as an anti-terrorism mechanism, the United States is unlikely to implement similar policies. 
The U.S. Constitution has been interpreted to prohibit unilateral citizenship-stripping as a tool of 
governance. Instead, denationalisation via expatriation in the U.S. requires the individual to 
specifically consent to relinquish the status, and such consent cannot be inferred from acts alone – 
even from acts which some (including some commentators in this symposium) would like to 
characterise as intrinsically antithetical to citizenship identity. The vigorous safeguarding of individual 
citizenship in US law is borne of the nation’s history of race-based slavery and its aftermath. Today, 
courts quite stringently interpret the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of citizenship status for “all 
persons born or naturalised in the U.S.” I realise the matter of slavery will seem remote from the 
concerns of contemporary transnational debates over citizenship-stripping in Europe and Canada 
(although it might be worth wondering, another day, if “slavery” could ever serve – along with 
“political death” – as a fruitful analytic metaphor here. Think, for example, of the recent mass 
denationalisation of Dominican-born Haitians in the Dominican Republic). Nevertheless, we know 
that national citizenship law and policy look inward as well as outward. In the U.S., the legacy of 
slavery forms a part of a deep conversational grammar about citizenship in a way that will almost 
certainly stay the hand of congressional advocates of the “Enemy Expatriation Act” and similar 
proposed measures. 
That the US is not about to join Britain and Canada and other states in a politics of forcible 
expatriation, however, by no means implies that the US does not wish to “permanently eliminate” 
suspected or confirmed terrorists, nor that it is unable to do so. Indeed, we have recently seen 
deployment by the U.S. of what Macklin calls “the sovereign’s other technique for permanent 
elimination” of such persons: namely: state-inflicted death. The 2013 assassination of U.S. citizen 
Anwar al-Awlaki in Yemen was a widely noted recent example of this policy (with the apparently 
accidental assassination Anwar’s 16-year-old U.S. citizen son, Abdulrahman, a notorious follow-up.) 
For some commentators, state acts of this kind may appear more “proportional” to the claimed 
offenses than expatriation is. Personally, I would not endorse any policy of assassination, much less 
when visited upon its target without application of due process. But my comments don’t concern the 
policy’s defensibility. Instead, I raise the al-Awlaki case to frame a few brief observations about the 
relationship between citizenship-stripping, targeted assassination and territoriality in the United States 
and beyond. 
First, as Macklin points out, states strip citizenship not merely in order to territorially banish the 
affected going forward but sometimes perhaps, as a “prelude to assassination,” whether by themselves 
or others. In particular, Macklin cites the cases of Britons who were denationalised and subsequently 
killed by US drone strike in Somalia.
1
 Denationalisation here can be understood to have strategically 
relieved Britain of the imperative of protecting its own nationals from harm, including assassination, 
by another state party. In this scenario, denationalisation is not merely a form of political death; as 
Macklin argues, it may facilitate bodily death as well. 
Nevertheless, we have also seen that since United States law makes it “easier to kill than 
expatriate,” in Peter Spiro’s succinct phrasing,2 the U.S. government does not await denationalisation 
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to assassinate its own citizens. We could, indeed, view assassination of al Awlaki senior as the 
nation’s only route to denationalise him, with assassination serving as the actual mechanism for 
stripping his citizenship. 
On the other hand, al Awlaki’s assassination precipitated a fascinating debate in the United States 
about territoriality and citizenship which perhaps bears on our transnational conversation here. In the 
wake of the killing, a segment of the US political class erupted in concerted anxiety about whether the 
government actually claimed authority not only to assassinate US citizens abroad but to do the same 
“on US soil.” Senator Rand Paul led a filibuster against the confirmation of proposed CIA Director 
John Brennan, promising to “speak as long as it takes until the alarm is sounded from coast to coast 
that our Constitution is important, that your rights to trial by jury are precious, [and] that no American 
should be killed by a drone on American soil without first being charged with a crime, [and] 
found…guilty by a court.” Much media fan-flaming followed, and eventually, Attorney General Eric 
Holder conceded that targeting any U.S. citizen for assassination within national territory—in the 
absence of imminent threat – is unacceptable. 3 
What was striking in this episode was the normative distinction taken up in popular discourse 
between in-country and out-of-country citizen assassination. The implied claim was that death of a 
citizen by its own government was somehow uniquely intolerable when accomplished inside national 
territorial bounds.
 
For that moment, at least, the American political imaginary seemed to coalesce 
more around fear of tyrannical government than of the foreign terrorist within. 
Of course, if government were in fact bound by this normative logic – i.e., that territorially present 
citizens are uniquely out of bounds for targeted killing – then the target would need to be 
denationalised and/or territorially expelled first and only executed thereafter. Yet since the US state is 
constrained in denationalising citizens, and since, like all states, it is precluded from expelling citizens, 
it would seem to have to await such person’s travel outside the country in order to strike. This seems 
odd, yet it notably parallels the form denationalisation practices take in many countries – where, 
according to Macklin, governments tend to strip citizenship from those citizens who are already 
located abroad. In both settings, we see not only that territorially-present citizens are regarded as 
possessing more fundamental protections against government power than those territorially absent, but 
that governments make opportunistic use of citizen absence to act against them. Among other things, 
this amounts to a kind of penalty on citizen mobility, and seems to rest on an arbitrary locational 
distinction. This, at least, is what the US Supreme Court itself concluded in 1957 in a related context 
when it wrote that a citizen’s constitutional rights may not “be stripped away just because he happens 
to be in another land.”4 
Of course, territoriality’s relationship with citizenship sometimes reaches back well beyond any 
possible denationalisation and assassination to the moment of the citizen’s birth. For some, the Awlaki 
affair itself evoked longstanding debates about assignment of citizenship based on territorial presence 
at birth, with Awlaki an exemplar of the “nominal citizen” whose extraterritoriality for most of his 
post-natal life rendered his social attachment to the nation “highly attenuated” (to use Macklin’s 
phrase). Yet in this setting as well, the United States will remain robustly-citizenship protective. The 
country’s inclusive birthright citizenship rules are another stanchion of its post-slavery, post-Civil 
War, constitutionalism. Consequently, and much as some “anti-birthers” wish it were otherwise, 
citizenship cannot be easily eliminated on the front end here, except by way more stringent 
immigration and border control policies to prevent, ex ante, potential parents’ territorial presence. 
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Broadly drawn and often selectively-applied grounds of inadmissibility and deportability based on 
“terrorist activity” arguably go some of the distance in accomplishing that end.5 
In short, citizenship status, especially for those in national territory, still remains more secure in the 
U.S. than it is in some other national settings. Our government works to counter the alleged “bad 
guys” (Baubock’s shorthand) by different means. 
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Beware states piercing holes into citizenship 
Matthew J. Gibney* 
I find a great deal to agree with in Audrey Macklin’s trenchant and wide-ranging argument against 
denationalisation power’s recent revival in Western countries. Yet I also understand where her critics 
are, somewhat abrasively, coming from. It is of course possible to imagine carefully fashioned cases 
where denationalisation seems a morally appropriate response as long as a range of guarantees are met 
(for example, when an individual represents a clear threat to the state, where there are no doubts about 
his guilt or intentions, and where he could be stripped of citizenship without being made stateless.) 
However, while this realisation might help us identify the terms on which the denationalisation of a 
particular individual is permissible, it tells us little about the broader consequences of piercing the 
norm of unconditional citizenship for punitive reasons.
1
 I think that once we are realistic about the 
political dangers of conceding to the state powers to withdraw citizenship, we’re brought back to a 
position compatible with Audrey Macklin’s ban on denationalisation. 
Before explaining why I think an absolute bar might be justified let make a couple of comments on 
the previous discussion. The first of these is on what one might call the statelessness constraint. All of 
the critics of Audrey Macklin’s position start (with the possible exception of Christian Joppke) by 
accepting that individuals, even those who commit terrorist acts, should not be made stateless. This 
constraint against statelessness is not simply a matter of international or domestic law; it is also a 
normative constraint that stems from basic liberal commitments. The problem with statelessness is that 
it leaves individuals subject to state power without citizenship’s basic protections against that power, 
including security of residence, political rights, and potentially a host of other entitlements. If we 
accept this normative rationale for guarding against statelessness, as I think we should, we will also 
want to ensure that those denationalised are not made de facto stateless, that is, forced to rely on a 
state that is unable and unwilling to protect them or otherwise to deliver the fundamental rights 
citizenship (or nationality) is supposed to guarantee.
2
 
Yet taking this additional constraint seriously is going to be very consequential. The secondary 
citizenships of the individuals Western states most want to strip of citizenship tend to be those of 
countries with dubious human rights records and histories of civil war and conflict (Somalia, Iraq, 
Eritrea, Sudan, to name a few).
3
 If de facto statelessness is a bar, most of the prime targets are going to 
be out of denationalisation’s reach. Of course, de facto statelessness does not establish a case for an 
absolute rejection of the state’s power to denationalise. But it does show why the power’s scope may 
be very narrow indeed, at least for liberals. 
Second, I find myself attracted to the position of Rainer Bauböck that one reason denationalisation 
is unacceptable is because it involves states “passing the buck” of their own responsibilities on to other 
states, a point that adds a different dimension to Audrey Macklin’s claim that citizenship is, in 
important respects, not fungible. This view that banishment is unfair to other states is a very old one. 
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None other than Voltaire argued against the practice of banishment on the grounds that it involves 
throwing into our neighbour’s field the stones that incommode us in our own.  
Powerful as it is, however, the consideration that there’s something wrong with denationalising 
“home grown” terrorists, wouldn’t mean that denationalisation was always inappropriate. States might 
still claim the moral right to denationalise individuals who had held citizenship only for a short period 
of time or had spent most of their lives living in the other country in which they held citizenship. 
Germany certainly should not have posthumously denationalised Hitler. But Hitler was the leader of 
the German state and celebrated in this role by a significant proportion of the German people during 
the 1930s and 1940s. Putting aside the question of what should be done posthumously, some citizens 
have a much more tenuous, even a merely nominal, relationship to the state. Not all are even grown at 
home. 
These considerations help to clarify some of the constraints necessary for a liberal denationalisation 
power. Even from the short discussion here, we can identify plenty of others. Peter Schuck suggests 
that an individual’s threat to the state needs to be “rigorously proven” and Kay Hailbronner argues that 
citizenship deprivation must be “subject to proportionality”. It’s clear that satisfying all of these 
different requirements will make the construction of denationalisation law consistent with liberal 
principles a Herculean task. However, where I part company with the denationalisers is not so much 
over whether it’s possible to identify a liberal starting point for the practice.4 Rather, my concern is 
over the illiberal direction denationalisation seems likely to take once it returns to the political 
repertoire. Here my position has been greatly influenced by the recent experience of the UK.
5
  
When denationalisation was first revived after over thirty years of desuetude by the Blair 
government in 2002, the power was tightly constrained: the definition incorporated was taken from the 
European Convention on Nationality, only dual nationals were targeted, and an automatic judicial 
appeal was to follow any decision by the Home Secretary. The government promised to use the power 
rarely. This modest beginning for denationalisation did not last. After the London bombings in July 
2005, a new act passed by the Blair government in 2006 lowered the standard required for 
denationalisation. While previously the Home Secretary had to be satisfied that an individual had 
engaged in actions that threatened the "vital interests of the UK" state, now he or she had only to be 
satisfied that taking away someone’s citizenship was “conducive to the public good”. The standard for 
continuing to hold British citizenship had now become the same as the one used to judge whether a 
non-citizen should be deported. Even after this radical change, it was possible to convince oneself that 
the government would use the power sparingly. Only a handful of people lost their citizenship under 
the Labour government’s watch. 
But with the coming of the Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition government things have gone 
seriously awry. In the Cameron government’s first year of office in 2010–11, no fewer than six people 
were stripped of their citizenship. This was more people than the Blair and Brown governments had 
denaturalised in the previous nine years (in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist events of 
September 11, 2001 and July 7, 2005). The enthusiastic use of deprivation power has continued apace 
in the years since, though almost always in secret. By May 2014, it was evident that Cameron’s 
government had some 23 people stripped of citizenship on ‘not conducive’ grounds in the last three 
years. Almost all of these individuals were stripped of citizenship while outside the UK, undermining 
real access to appeal procedures. In January this year the government presented a bill to parliament 
requesting the power to strip citizenship from naturalised citizens even if they would be made 
stateless. The amendment passed, albeit, in a modified form. Under current law in the UK a 
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naturalised citizen can be made stateless if the Home Secretary deems there are reasonable grounds for 
believing they have access to another citizenship.  
Now it might be said – and Christian Joppke would probably be the one to say it – that the UK is 
an outlier. The unravelling of constraints on denationalisation evident in Britain is unlikely to be 
repeated elsewhere because other Western countries are less insouciant about protecting rights. But 
note that the circumstances that have geed along transformation in UK law are generally applicable: 
terrorist events (the 2005 Tube bombing) and a change of government (the coming of the 
Conservatives to power). Moreover, I’m not confident that other countries are as legally protected 
against creep of denationalisation power as they might seem. Australia has fewer rights based 
protections even than the UK; Canada has some alarming inclusions in its recent denationalisation 
legislation, including the state’s ability to rely on a conviction for terrorist offences in another country; 
and, as I write, a large number of prominent US politicians (buoyed by public opinion polls) have 
effectively endorsed torture as a practice for dealing with terrorists past and future.  
I thus find myself agreeing with Audrey Macklin’s embrace of unconditional citizenship, albeit 
because I fear where we will end up if we try to pierce even a small – liberal size – hole into 
citizenship to punish terrorists. Liberalism is not simply a set of principles, it’s also a political stance – 
one that encourages a healthy scepticism of state attempts to encroach upon established rights and 
protections. In these fraught times, it is wise to adopt the stance as well as to protect the principles. 
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Disowning citizens 
Reuven (Ruvi) Ziegler* 
Macklin’s kick-off focused ‘exclusively on denationalisation for allegedly disloyal conduct by a 
citizen, while a citizen’. Most contributions to this debate weighed the predicament of the former 
citizen against state interests. In my contribution, I offer a typology of cases in which revocation could 
be sought according to some of the contributors. I contend that disowning of citizens by their states is 
incoherent, tenuous, or disingenuous. 
The first type of case involves acts which, according to Hailbronner, undermine the constitutional 
order by seriously threatening public safety and state security. Hailbronner contends that individuals 
performing such acts ‘have given up their attachment to a community by attacking the very fundament 
of that community, not by merely violating its internal rules of public order’. However, this line-
drawing exercise seems to be quite difficult: every crime may cause insecurity, threaten public order, 
and prevent democratic societies from functioning properly; citizens (and decision-makers, including 
those entrusted with citizenship revocation) will diverge, based on their ideological biases, as to 
whether particular crimes cross Hailbronner’s threshold. For instance, did the perpetrators of the 
Brighton hotel bombing cross the threshold in light of the potential ramifications of Thatcher’s 
assassination for the stability of the United Kingdom? If so, would a person financing such an attack 
qualify, too?  
Nevertheless, perhaps a ‘core’ case can be identified, such as a criminal conviction for treason. One 
of the constituent elements of such acts is often that they are committed by citizens qua citizens. For 
instance, Lord Haw Haw (William Joyce) could be convicted of espionage for Germany in the Second 
World War because he possessed British nationality; he unsuccessfully argued that he did not owe 
loyalty to the Crown. If the basis for Joyce’s conviction was that his crimes against the state were 
committed as a British national, then disowning Joyce ex post facto seems incoherent: the state must 
reject the claim that treasonous acts amount to renunciation of citizenship, because that would disable 
the state from prosecuting the perpetrator for treason (for an analogous argument concerning the 
legitimacy of disenfranchisement of convicted adult citizens, see my article).  
The second type of case involves crimes (including crimes defined as ‘terrorism’ under 
international treaties or domestic law) committed by a citizen of state A against individuals or 
institutions in state B. The fact that the person who has committed such crimes holds the citizenship of 
state A seems incidental. Consider the attack on the Jewish museum of Belgium in Brussels on 24 
May 2014, which is likely to have been carried out by a French national affiliated with ISIL. ISIL has 
been designated as a terrorist organisation by the EU, of which France is a member, as well as by the 
UN. Were France to revoke the citizenship of this member of an internationally designated terrorist 
organisation, it would be severing legal relations with a citizen even though the citizen’s actions were 
not directed specifically towards the French state, its institutions, or its population. This seems rather 
tenuous.  
Joppke argued that ‘international terrorists are not criminals but warriors’. But the state exercises 
its sovereign powers vis-à-vis ‘international terrorists’ qua citizens. The fact that such persons commit 
acts that are of an international character does not make it more plausible for their state of nationality 
to legally disown them as a result. Hailbronner argues that ‘[w]hat makes international terrorism so 
distinctive is … also its relevance for discontinuance of that special relationship established by 
citizenship.’ I am not quite sure why engagement in international terrorism (such as the ISIL-
sponsored attack on the Jewish museum) necessarily or even plausibly indicate that a citizenship bond 
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has been severed by the terrorist. This seems to conflate the fact that their state of nationality perceives 
(and rightly so) the terrorist’s act as heinous with a direct effect on that state. 
The third type of case concerns acts which are committed by a citizen in the name of the Ancien 
Régime. Following political transformation, the state wishes to disassociate itself from such past acts 
by dissociating itself from the perpetrators. As Bauböck rightly notes, Hitler’s posthumous 
denationalisation by either Germany or Austria would have been considered ‘a denial of responsibility 
for his crimes and their consequences’. In addition to the revocation’s outward-looking dimension 
(towards the international community), it has an inward-looking dimension too. When Augusto 
Pinochet stood trial in in 2004, he was charged with crimes committed by him as head of the military 
junta which ruled Chile after the 1973 coup. He died in 2006 before the conclusion of his trial. Let’s 
imagine that Pinochet had another (nominal) citizenship, and that his conviction would have resulted 
in his denationalisation. This would have seemed, rightly, as an attempt to undermine the fact that 
these acts were committed in the name of the Chilean state. 
Paskalev asserted that, ironically, the ‘softness of citizenship revocation makes it appear quite 
inappropriate for the case of terrorists’. However, even if (some) terrorists may be blasé about losing 
their citizenship, we ought to be concerned about states’ eagerness to wash their hands of them. 
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Our epoch's little banishments 
Saskia Sassen* 
I arrive late to this discussion, to these excellent pieces that cover much ground... not much left to 
cover. For the sake of debate and commentary, rather than scholarly analysis, let me throw into the 
discussion what is no more than a little wrench.  
Denationalisation is an ambiguous concept. This discussion has given it one sharp meaning: being 
stripped of one's nationality and thrown out of one's country. In my own work I have used it to capture 
more ambiguous meanings, thereby giving it the status of a variable that can be applied to a range of 
domains, not only citizenship.
1
 
Thus, I see denationalisation at work when, beginning in the 1980s, global firms pushed for and got 
most national governments to institute deregulations and privatisations so as to maximise their access 
into any national economy. It meant that states had to denationalise key elements of the legal framing 
(i.e. protections) they had long offered their own firms, markets, investors. One might say that in 
doing so, these states instituted a partial 'banishment' of their own national firms from a legal framing 
that granted these national firms exclusive privileges/rights. This is a form of banishment that does not 
entail a physical departure from a country's territory. It only entails a loss of particular exclusive rights 
and protections. We can conceive of it as a kind of micro-banishment. 
Similarly, I would argue that such internal micro-banishments are also present in the decisions of 
many national states, beginning in the 1980s and onwards, to eliminate a few rights here and there that 
their citizens may long have had. Examples for the U.S. are, among several others, Clinton's 1996 
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act which took away the rights of citizens 
to bring legal action against the INS in lower courts; or when credit card companies obtained the right 
to pursue payment even if a household had declared bankruptcy – a right so abusive it eventually got 
cancelled. We might argue that in these cases, citizens experienced a partial banishment from specific 
rights (even as some new rights were also attained, notably gay marriage). The better language to 
describe these losses may be what Audrey Macklin refers to elsewhere as civil death.
2
 
Current examples for the gains of rights for global firms and the loss of protections for national 
firms and workers can be found in some of the clauses of both the Transpacific and the Transatlantic 
Trade Partnerships. 
Long before we get to the dramatic figure of the terrorist, where the debate about banishment turns 
clearly pro or contra, I see a range of micro-banishments that take place deep inside national territory. 
If I wanted to give this image an extreme character, I would say that in today's interaction prone world 
(see, for instance, the earlier behind closed-doors negotiations between Iran and the U.S., or, for a 
period, between the U.S. and the Taliban) there is no more terra nullius for banishment. 
If I were to use the term "banishment," I would want to use its conceptual power to get at the 
multiple little banishments that happen inside our countries and that often entail a move into systemic 
invisibility – the loss of rights as an event that produces its own partial, or specialised, erasure. I refer 
to these micro-banishments as expulsions, a term I intend as radically different from the more common 
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term "exclusion," which refers to a condition internal to a system, such as discrimination.
3
 I conceive 
of such expulsions as a systemic capability, clearly a use of the term capability that diverges from the 
common use which marks it as a positive. Thus micro-banishments can be seen as a profoundly 
negative systemic capability that is far more widespread than our current categories of analysis allow 
us to see.
4
  
To conclude I would like to return to Audrey Macklin's argument. 
I agree with Audrey Macklin's proposition that citizens should not be banished even when they 
engage in terrorist attacks on their own country. I share her concern with the importance of protecting 
a robust form of citizenship. But I do so partly also from a transversal and dystopian perspective that 
may have little to do with the rationale put forth by Macklin. Let me clarify. It is not only terrorists 
that are destructive and attack the innocent; it is also predatory actors of all sorts –corporate firms that 
exploit workers worldwide, financial speculators, abusive prison systems. Further I agree with 
Macklin that a country should develop the needed internal instruments to deal with terrorists rather 
than banish them. But again, I would take this beyond terrorists who are citizens, and include the types 
of predatory actors I refer to above. 
Beyond all of this, I am above all concerned with the larger history in the making that I refer to 
earlier in this short text. This larger history is shaping an epochal condition that takes me away from 
prioritising banishment as loss of citizenship and of the right to live in one's country as discussed in 
this forum. 
Briefly put, I would argue that the conceptual locus of the category banishment in today's world is 
not banishment in the historical sense of the term, but a new kind of banishment. It is one predicated 
on the formation of geographies of privilege and disadvantage that cut across the divides of our 
modernity – East-West, North-South. The formation of such geographies includes a partial 
disassembling of the modern national territorial project, one aspiring (and dependent on) national 
unity, whether actual or idealised. This then also means that there is a weakening of the explanatory 
power of the nation-based encasements of membership (for citizens, for firms, for political systems) 
that have marked our modernity. The micro-banishments I refer to are part of emergent (and 
proliferating!) geographies of disadvantage (for citizens, firms, districts) internal to a country.  
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 This also raises the possibility of an obverse condition: that the tissue constructed via the recurrence of micro-
banishments inside a nation-state could, with time, become the tissue for a claim to transnational citizenship. Could it be 
that as citizens experience the limits of national citizenship, transversal notions of membership become more plausible? I 
am thinking here of substantive conditions for transnational citizenship, not just ideational one. 
 47 
Deprivation of citizenship: is there an issue of EU law? 
Jo Shaw* 
The purpose of this short intervention in the debate on The Return of Banishment initiated by Audrey 
Macklin, where the pros and cons of various forms of deprivation policies pursued by, or sought by, 
liberal states have been fully debated, is to add an element of EU law. Specifically, in the light of the 
judgments of the European Court of Justice in Rottmann and Ruiz Zambrano, how – if at all – are 
Member States’ law and procedures on involuntary loss of citizenship affected by EU law, given that 
the primary competence to determine the rules on the acquisition and loss of citizenship remains with 
Member States? We have yet to hear conclusively, but well informed observers who followed the UK 
Supreme Court hearing in the case of B2 (Pham) v SSHD concerned with the UK’s rather extensive 
deprivation powers and the issue of statelessness have indicated that they think it likely that the 
Supreme Court will now make a reference to the Court of Justice. It seems that the judges will ask the 
CJEU if it really meant what it said when it decided the case of Rottmann. B2 (Pham), like the earlier 
cases of G1 (discussed below) and as well as the case of Al Jedda, a former Iraqi citizen who has twice 
been stripped of his UK citizenship as well as spending time in military detention in Iraq, all concern 
naturalised citizens who are suspected of some form of terrorist involvement, but against none of 
whom criminal proceedings have been brought in the UK. 
We are likely, therefore, to be in a phase of further legal development – initially in iteration 
between the UK courts and the Court of Justice, but with implications for all of the Member States as 
quite a number of states have started to look closely at using expatriation measures in order to combat 
radicalisation and terrorist threats, even if many judge this approach to be ill-advised and 
inappropriate. 
I will explain briefly what the issues are. The Rottmann case was the subject of an earlier forum 
debate on the EUDO Citizenship website. Rottmann was a case of loss of citizenship conferred by 
naturalisation, after it came to light that the naturalisation had been obtained by fraud. In this case, 
Rottmann, an Austrian citizen, had failed to reveal that he had been the subject of unconcluded 
criminal proceedings in Austria when seeking naturalisation in Germany. Rottmann raised issues of 
EU law in his appeal against the deprivation decision before the German administrative courts, which 
led to a reference to the Court of Justice. He pointed out that having obtained German citizenship he 
lost Austrian citizenship, by operation of law. Thus, if he were deprived of German citizenship he 
would be stateless, and – furthermore – he would have lost his EU citizenship. One issue that had been 
raised – and which caught the attention of Advocate General Maduro in his Opinion – was whether 
this was a ‘wholly internal situation’ – i.e. a German court reviewing a decision of a German public 
authority regarding a German citizen. In that sense, it could be said, EU citizenship was not engaged at 
all. In response, the Court repeated its standard formulation when dealing with matters which fall 
outside the competence of the EU and its legislature. It reminded us that EU cannot adopt measures 
with regard to national citizenship, but none the less while national competence remains intact, it must 
be exercised ‘with due regard’ to the requirements of EU law in situations covered by EU law. 
Specifically, in this case, said the Court: 
‘It is clear that the situation of a citizen of the Union who, like the applicant in the main 
proceedings, is faced with a decision withdrawing his naturalisation, adopted by the authorities of 
one Member State, and placing him, after he has lost the nationality of another Member State that 
he originally possessed, in a position capable of causing him to lose the status conferred by Article 
17 EC [i.e. Union citizenship] and the rights attaching thereto falls, by reason of its nature and its 
consequences, within the ambit of European Union law’ (para. 42 of the judgment). 
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The Court went on to recognise that states may have legitimate reasons to withdraw citizenship, but it 
is worth noting that the Court of Justice does not, in this paragraph, focus on statelessness, but rather 
on the loss of the rights specific to EU law. In other words, this can be seen as an EU-specific reason 
for requiring the testing of any decision to withdraw citizenship against – as the Court went on to hold 
– a standard of proportionality. Factors to be borne in mind in assessing the proportionality of the 
withdrawal decision included the gravity of the original offence or deception, lapse of time, the impact 
on the subject of the decision and their family, the possibility of recovering the original citizenship lost 
at the time of naturalisation, and the availability of other less severe measures than withdrawal. 
While some have suggested that the essence of Rottmann lay in the way that the claimant is strung 
across between the national citizenship laws of two EU Member States, one at least of which claims 
exclusivity and thus operates an automatic rule of withdrawal in the event that a citizen acquires the 
citizenship of another state, the point about loss of the benefits of EU citizenship as a freestanding 
principle of EU law without regard to prior movement from one Member State to another was given a 
further boost in the case of Ruiz Zambrano. In that case, the EU citizens threatened with losing their 
rights of citizenship were the children of the claimant, who were born in Belgium and who had 
acquired Belgian, and thus EU, citizenship at birth. Meanwhile, through a combination of 
circumstances their Colombian citizen father had not regularised his situation in Belgium (or had 
perhaps been prevented from doing so by a series of delays perpetrated by the Belgian authorities in 
relation to his case). Because the refusal of a residence permit for Ruiz Zambrano and his wife would, 
in effect, have meant that the EU citizen children would have been obliged to leave, with their parents, 
the territory of the EU and thus would not have been able to avail themselves of their rights as EU 
citizens (notably the right of free movement which they had not yet exercised, but which they might 
exercise in the future), the Court concluded that a Member State could not refuse to grant either a 
residence permit or indeed a work permit. The test that the Court articulated was whether the measure 
taken in relation to a third country national upon whom the EU citizen children were dependent was 
whether it would make them unable to exercise ‘the substance of their rights’ as citizens of the EU. 
Neither Rottmann nor – in particular – Ruiz Zambrano have been met with unalloyed enthusiasm at 
the national level. It goes beyond the scope of this short comment to discuss how and why Member 
States and indeed their courts might react to challenging judgments of the Court of Justice that appear 
to extend the scope of EU law and, in particular, the scope of EU citizenship.
1
 That said, there is no 
evidence to suggest that, thus far, Rottmann has had a significant or disruptive effect on national 
citizenship laws.
2
  
The UK is one of the few states where Rottmann has thus far been discussed in national cases, but – 
until the case of B2 (Pham) which is before the Supreme Court – the limit of consideration had been a 
rather dismissive swipe at the Court of Justice taken by Lord Justice Laws in the Court of Appeal in 
the case of G1 v SSHD
3
. Laws LJ sceptically asked ‘[u]pon what principled basis, therefore, should 
the grant or withdrawal of State citizenship be qualified by an obligation to "have due regard" to the 
law of the European Union?’ (para. 38), given that the grant and withdrawal of citizenship remains a 
matter of Member State competence. 
The Supreme Court refused to give leave to appeal to the applicant in G1, but perhaps it was only a 
matter of time, given the salience of deprivation of citizenship in the UK at the present time, before it 
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had to grasp the nettle of considering not only the meaning of statelessness in the context of the then 
applicable UK law (this having moved on somewhat since that time, as Gibney’s contribution to the 
forum highlights) but also the possible applicability of EU law as a restraint upon executive freedom, 
and as a standard which UK courts, in exercising their review function, would need to uphold. Hence 
the appellant in B2 has been given leave to appeal, with perhaps a reference to the Court of Justice still 
to come.  
As the discussion by Simon Cox, a lawyer working with the Open Society Institute which 
intervened in this case, has made clear, it seems quite likely that if the applicability of EU law as a 
frame of reference against which UK deprivation legislation needs to be judged is duly established by 
the Court of Justice and accepted by the Supreme Court, then the proportionality standards which need 
to be applied by UK courts exercising their review function may differ from those otherwise 
applicable within UK public law. The key issue seems likely to surround the putative autonomy of EU 
citizenship: is there a freestanding EU law related concern with citizenship stripping, namely the loss 
of EU citizenship rights, which goes beyond the issue of statelessness? Rottmann seemed to suggest 
there was, but this is the issue on which the Supreme Court may probe the CJEU further. It should be 
noted that there may also be higher standards of disclosure of otherwise secret evidence, following the 
judgment of the Court of Justice in the ZZ case, if the applicability of EU law is accepted.  
Finally, it should be pointed out that the OSI interest in the case is not directly with the Rottmann 
point, but concerns the definition of statelessness, which, they argue also has an EU element and 
should have a common EU level definition to which Member States are obliged to adhere. This call 
stems from the fear that in its earlier judgment in B2 (Pham) the Court of Appeal created significant 
difficulties when it resolved that B2 was not to be judged as de jure stateless, once deprived of UK 
citizenship, because although the Vietnamese government indicated they did not recognise him as a 
citizen, it was clear that this was unlawful under Vietnamese law. 
The UK courts, said the Court of Appeal, were bound by the rule of law. Therefore, they could not 
recognise an unlawful act of the Vietnamese government. This seems to be peculiarly Kafka-esque 
reasoning and the OSI, given its investment in the campaign against statelessness ongoing under the 
leadership of the UNHCR, would be concerned if this reasoning were to take hold in the UK, which is 
bound to have further cases coming before the courts, given the remarkable rate at which the state is 
now expatriating its citizens on grounds that this is conducive to the public good. 
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On producing the alien within: A reply 
Audrey Macklin* 
Shortly after the last contributor posted a comment on this forum, reports of the Charlie Hebdo attacks 
erupted in the media. The assailants were two French brothers (Cherif and Siad Kouachi) who claimed 
affiliation to Al Qaeda in Yemen. Hours later, an associate (Amiday Coulibaly) killed a police officer, 
then rampaged through a kosher Hyper Cacher supermarket and murdered four hostages. All three 
men were slain two days later in confrontations with French police and security. That same day, the 
notorious ‘Finsbury Mosque cleric’, British national Abu Hamza, was sentenced to life in prison by a 
US court for terrorism related crimes. Most recently, the French Conseil Constitutionnel upheld a law 
permitting denaturalisation of dual-national French citizens convicted of terrorist offences.
1
 One 
cannot but wonder whether the Charlie Hebdo and Hyper Cacher attacks cast a long shadow over the 
Conseil Constitutionnel’s deliberations, even though all three men were French by birth and therefore 
outside the purview of the denaturalisation law. 
The horrific deeds of the French perpetrators struck at the heart of liberal democratic values: 
freedom of expression and religious tolerance. States understandably seek new and better tools to 
prevent future atrocities; the impulse toward retribution at such moments seems hard to resist. Do 
these attacks make the case for citizenship revocation? I remain skeptical that citizenship revocation 
advances the objective of protecting liberal democracies, or that pursuit of unalloyed retribution is an 
objective worthy of liberal democracies. 
Defenders of citizenship stripping offer a mix of instrumental and non-instrumental justifications, 
but Kay Hailbronner, Christian Joppke and Peter Schuck lean toward the latter more than the former. 
Despite its rejection by the US Supreme Court over fifty years ago, both Hailbronner and Joppke 
revert to the legal fiction of constructive renunciation and insist that certain conduct communicates an 
irrefutable intention of terrorists to renounce their own citizenship. Schuck revises the fiction by 
acknowledging that perpetrators may not actually wish to renounce citizenship, but then discounts an 
intention to maintain citizenship for ‘tactical and cynical’ purposes. But however attractive the fiction 
of constructive renunciation, it does not become truer with repetition, or with the passage of time, or 
by writing new characters into the narrative. Citizenship revocation for misconduct while a citizen is 
not chosen by the citizen; it is inflicted by the state. 
Joppke explains that Germany would have been wrong to regard members of the RAF as menacing 
enough to warrant denationalisation, and I suspect he would also condemn the United States 
denaturalisation of Communist citizens in the twentieth century as hysterical overreaction. But he 
remains confident that one can transcend historic patterns of panic-induced political myopia and he 
thus arrives at the conclusion that Islamic terrorists are uniquely suitable for citizenship revocation. 
Peter Schuck contends that citizenship revocation, when employed judiciously against terrorists, 
strengthens the value of citizenship itself. Kay Hailbronner adds that my arguments do not address the 
illegality of citizenship revocation under international or constitutional law, but rather proceed from 
unarticulated notions of legitimacy and morality. Space does not permit a proper reply to the last 
criticism. Readers are invited to read my published article on citizenship revocation in the Queen’s 
Law Journal, which addresses citizenship revocation for misconduct under international and 
constitutional law.
2
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Consider citizenship revocation in relation to the goal of bringing perpetrators to justice. As I 
mentioned in my kickoff text, fear of citizenship revocation is unlikely to deter those bent on 
martyrdom, and the deaths of the Kaouchi brothers and Coulibaly seem to demonstrate that. As for 
Abu Hamza, it is worth noting that the UK did attempt to strip him of citizenship. It was thwarted 
because deprivation would have rendered the Egyptian-born cleric stateless. But the fact that Abu 
Hamza remained in the UK as a UK citizen made him available for extradition to face charges in the 
United States, where he was tried, convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment for terrorism offences 
after an open and fair trial. Had he been stripped of UK citizenship and expelled to Egypt, he would 
never have faced justice in a US court, or anywhere for that matter.
3
 I take the view that prosecution, 
trial and conviction are preferable responses to past acts. As for pre-empting incipient risks, various 
states have begun revoking passports of citizens allegedly bound for IS camps in Syria and Iraq. 
Restricting exit in this manner is only available in relation to citizens. Stripping citizenship permits 
states to shed their duty and responsibility toward nationals; it also deprives them of the authority to 
subject them to criminal prosecution and to thereby make a tangible contribution to bringing terrorists 
to justice under the rule of law.  
Schuck, along with Hailbronner and Joppke, concede that existing practices of citizenship 
revocation breach basic norms of fairness. They regard these flaws as contingent defects that are 
severable from the abstract question of whether citizenship revocation for misconduct can be justified. 
I find the attempt to segregate theory from practice unconvincing in this context, and Matthew 
Gibney’s intervention highlights the way in which attempts by the judiciary to hold the state to 
requirements of legality simply breed more tactics of state evasion. A chronic failure of a state practice 
to comply with fundamental norms of legality across time and space invites the inference that there is 
something about what the state is endeavouring to do that ineluctably and incorrigibly perverts the 
process of how it does it.
4
 A fair process leading to banishment, like a fair process culminating in the 
death penalty, can only ever operate as a mirage that legitimates ongoing practices that will – 
inevitably and necessarily – fail to meet basic norms associated with the rule of law. 
This leaves a defence of citizenship revocation that does not depend on practicality or utility, but 
instead rests on the insistence that revocation is just and fitting punishment of those who abuse the 
privilege of citizenship. I argue that when citizenship becomes revocable for misconduct, citizenship 
as legal status is demoted from right to privilege. This is a specifically legal argument about the 
juridical fragility of a privilege compared to a right. Joppke’s comment that citizenship in western 
states is a privilege because citizenship delivers so little to citizens of most states is a non-sequitur. I 
may feel privileged to be a Canadian citizen and to benefit from the rights, entitlements and security of 
Canadian citizenship, but that does not make citizenship as such a privilege. And it would be peculiar 
indeed if only liberal democratic states that guarantee robust citizenship were entitled to revoke 
citizenship qua privilege, while poor and dysfunctional states that deliver only a meagre citizenship, 
were not so entitled. Schuck maintains that citizenship revocation, properly wielded, does not weaken 
citizenship, but can actually ”strengthen citizenship by reaffirming the conditions on which it is 
based.” I am not sure exactly what this means but his subsequent invocation of capital punishment 
does alert one to the rhetorical symmetry of his claim with similar assertions by death-penalty 
advocates: If one is convinced that the value of life is strengthened when the state executes a murderer, 
perhaps one will also be persuaded that citizenship is strengthened when the state denationalises a 
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terrorist. The corollary also applies: If one is not attracted by the first proposition, perhaps one should 
resist being seduced by the second. 
Jo Shaw’s insightful intervention about the implications of denationalisation for EU citizenship 
brings to the discussion the important issue of proportionality, a matter Hailbronner also addresses 
briefly. Stepping back from the specificities of EU citizenship, a proportionality inquiry into 
citizenship deprivation directs us to the question of whether the state can achieve its objectives 
through less rights-infringing means than the impugned law. If one takes seriously the injunction 
against statelessness, the answer must surely be yes. However one frames the goals and purposes of 
citizenship deprivation, it remains true that states can and do deploy other means to address, contain 
and denounce threats to national security from mono-nationals.
5
 They must do so because 
denationalisation is not a legal option, yet no state will be heard to say that it is disabled from 
protecting the nation adequately because it cannot denationalise mono-citizens. 
Schuck proclaims that a state is “powerless to protect itself and its people from imminent, 
existential threats”, if denied access to denationalisation as a weapon. Not only does this ignore the 
resources currently available to states, it dramatically overestimates what citizenship revocation would 
add to the arsenal. Unless a state could mount evidence showing that dual citizens pose a qualitatively 
different and graver threat to national security than mono-nationals, I doubt that citizenship revocation 
for some citizens (but not others) could survive a rigorous proportionality analysis. And is it really a 
good idea to dump an “imminent, existential threat” on another state and its people anyway? 
Rainer Bauböck correctly and helpfully reminds us that what is at issue is citizenship as legal 
status. Legal citizenship, as an institution that regulates membership within and between states, 
performs certain specific functions that have formal implications. Among liberal states, equality of 
status and security of that status are two defining features of legal citizenship. The former speaks to 
citizenship’s internal dimension by ensuring that all citizens within a state are recognised and treated 
as equal to one another. The latter speaks to citizenship’s external dimension. In functional terms, 
nationality not only protects individuals from what Michael Walzer calls the ‘infinite precarity’ of 
statelessness, it also serves an international system of sovereign states in ensuring that at least one 
mailing address is affixed to every individual for purposes of state responsibility and deportation.  
Apart from Joppke, all contributors accept statelessness as a constraint on citizenship stripping. In 
the world as we know it, where all habitable space is already assigned to some state, the claim that a 
citizen, by virtue of his or her conduct, does not belong to this state must, therefore, entail the claim 
that the person does belong to that state.
6
 This exposes two related problems for conduct-based 
revocation. The first is that the people whom Joppke depicts as appropriate targets of denationalisation 
are not merely enemies of a particular state or government. On his view, they ‘explicitly posit 
themselves outside the political community of the nation-state’. In other words, they repudiate 
citizenship as such or, if one prefers, pose as ‘citizens’ of a non-state entity that every other state in the 
world rightly regards as deeply threatening and inimical to their security. One expects that they will be 
as ‘tactical and cynical’ in their connection to one citizenship as to another. The Canadian citizenship 
revocation law validates this model of the global terrorist by making conviction for a terrorist-related 
offence in another country grounds for revoking Canadian citizenship. If another state regards a 
                                                     
5
 States can and do use the criminal law to prosecute people for terrorist related offences committed at home and abroad. 
Expanded police powers of investigation and surveillance enable detection. Passport confiscation that prevents travel to 
conflict zones restrains a right of citizenship (exit), and some states prosecute citizens who participation in combat abroad 
when the return. Some states also restrict the right of citizens abroad to re-enter in the name of national security. I 
consider this less defensible as a matter of law, both in relation to the excluded citizen and other affected states but 
cannot develop that argument here. 
6
 One could, I suppose, imagine a world where states re-appropriate statelessness in order to resurrect the figure of the 
global legal outcast (hostis humani, or perhaps homo sacer). Stripped of law’s protection, this global outlaw could be 
killed or punished with impunity. I will set this aside this possibility, and I am unsure if this is what Joppke has in mind. 
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Canadian citizen as a terrorist, that is reason enough for Canada to conclude that his citizenship 
connection to Canada is inauthentic and warrants amputation. 
Joppke’s own characterization of the terrorist’s relationship to citizenship makes his argument 
about denationalisation self-defeating. If terrorists disavow citizenship as such, and are indeed hostis 
humani generi (enemies of all humanity), the same facts that would allow Joppke to pronounce that 
the Kouachis (for example) did not really belong to France must also yield the conclusion that they did 
not belong to any other state either. As a practical matter, if one state declares that formal possession 
of legal status is normatively insufficient to attach the terrorist to that state, it can hardly press the 
claim that legal status is sufficient to attach him to another state. 
Joppke mocks Peter Spiro for making the sensible observation that neither al Qaeda nor Islamic 
State are states, which means that they are not deportation destinations. Hailbronner abets Joppke by 
musing about whether IS’ military control over patches of land in the midst of violent conflict could 
be ratcheted up into something approximating statehood. If this is meant to hint at a viable legal option 
for where to dispose of otherwise stateless citizens, one might as well explore the equally plausible 
(from a legal perspective) option of launching them into space to orbit the globe aboard some inter-
galactic Flying Dutchmen.
7
 Alternatively, perhaps we are meant to shrug off as a convenient fact that 
powerful states can opportunistically denationalise their citizens while they are abroad in conflict 
zones. Even if they are rendered stateless, they become some other [failing] state’s problem.  
Bauböck’s contribution directs one to another dimension of belonging, which reveals the second 
problem with Joppke’s approach. Citizenship stripping’s revival traces back to the anxiety about so-
called ‘home-grown’ terrorists who, unlike the iconic foreign menace, actually possess citizenship by 
birth. Revoking citizenship enables the state to recast them as the alien within, in order to then cast 
them out. Denationalisation serves the narrative of terrorism as always and essentially foreign to the 
body politic by literally transforming the citizen-terrorist into the foreign outcast. But the very term 
‘home-grown’ refutes the premise. The Kaouchi brothers were French citizens. They were orphaned as 
children and raised as wards of the French state. It is difficult to see them other than as products of 
French society. The ideology that seized them originated elsewhere, but their receptivity to it also 
directs one’s attention inward. Indeed, any viable anti-terrorism strategy must attend carefully and 
critically to the local conditions that produce a descent into disaffection, hatred and violence – whether 
of the Islamist, neo-Nazi or any other variety. The French assailants may have been alienated from 
France, but there is no state to which they belonged more.
8
 
Ultimately, arguments about citizenship revocation turn on underlying conceptions of what 
citizenship is for, and expectations about what citizenship as legal status can achieve. Citizenship 
signifies membership, but beyond that general descriptor, citizenship inhabits multiple registers across 
many disciplines which are not reducible to or fully commensurate with one another. Citizenship as 
legal status is powerful because it carries the force of law, but also limited in what it can achieve for 
precisely the same reason. It is enabled and constrained because it is citizenship law and because it is 
citizenship law. 
                                                     
7
 It seems more likely that the UK will simply continue the practice of depriving citizens of their UK citizenship while 
abroad, now accompanied with a statement that the Home Secretary believes that target can obtain citizenship elsewhere. 
Even if the person does not, in fact, have access to another citizenship, the individual’s physical location outside the UK 
and inside another state (to which they may have no legal relationship) will impose insuperable hurdles on challenging 
the decision or compelling the UK to repatriate him. 
8
 One might object that the sample set is too limited: After all, there are dual citizens (especially those who naturalised as 
adults) who might reasonably be understood as more connected to their country of origin. A short answer is that even if 
true, it would be a clear conflict of interest to let one state of citizenship make that determination. A fuller answer, which 
lies beyond the scope of this intervention, would explain why this type of calculus is inimical to the security that 
distinguishes citizenship from other statuses. 
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States can and do use law to promote and endorse commitment, patriotism and active citizenship. 
They do it through public education, programmes for social inclusion, support and assistance, 
sponsorship of the arts and recreation, and other policies that build solidarity and encourage ‘good 
citizenship’. These various spheres of public activity are enabled through legal frameworks, and so 
law plays an important role here. Citizenship law’s chief constructive contribution lies in imposing 
(reasonable) requirements for naturalisation, such as residence and language acquisition, that 
genuinely facilitate integration and commitment to the national community. 
The state must also be concerned about ‘bad citizenship’ and it falls to the criminal justice and 
national security regimes to address the most egregious conduct that endangers or harms the national 
community. To conclude that contemporary citizenship law is ill-suited to advancing punitive goals 
does not deny that some people are very bad citizens, or that law plays a crucial role in addressing that 
fact. It simply opposes the recruitment of citizenship law to punish bad citizens by demoting them to 
non-citizens.
9
 A man who attacks his mother may be a terrible son who deserves to be prosecuted for 
his crime, but it is not the job of family law to disclaim him as the son of his mother. Citizenship law 
is not criminal law. Nor is it national security law. Nor should it be rigged to operate as a trap door 
that shunts citizens to immigration law. 
Accounting for citizenship status’ specific legal character also guides us toward what law can (and 
cannot) achieve. A number of plausible accounts of citizenship’s normative foundation circulate in 
political theory. They typically involve some idea of commitment or allegiance, whether to the state, 
the constitution, or democratic self-government. I do not here express a preference among them, but 
rather observe that they tend to focus on the internal relationship between state and citizen, and the 
grounds upon which the relationship may be properly said to have ruptured. They do not attend to the 
external dimension of legal citizenship, namely the role of nationality in stabilising the international 
filing system for humanity, and they do not furnish a satisfactory normative explanation for why the 
‘bad citizen’ should be assigned to another state. 
Citizenship law cannot subject to legal regulation the myriad values, practices and aspirations 
ascribed to citizenship-as-belonging. This is unsurprising: Citizenship status enfranchises citizens 
above the age of majority, but there is no legal compulsion to vote (except in Australia. Belgium, 
Brazil and a few other states) and citizenship law does not purport to penalise those who never 
exercise their right or duty of active citizenship. Nor does citizenship law purport to regulate access to 
most types of civil and social citizenship (in Marshallian terms), and I suspect most commentators 
agree that that is a good thing. 
Nevertheless, defenders of revocation insist that citizenship law can and should regulate ‘loyalty 
and allegiance’ of citizens. The criminal law can punish people for intentionally committing wrongful 
acts, including treason, murder, and all other forms of horrific violence that concern us here. Some 
assailants may openly express contempt for their country of citizenship, while others (like the Ottawa 
shooter Joppke cites) display a messy history of mental illness, drug addiction and petty criminality 
preceding recent conversion to Islam. The putative value added by citizenship revocation is precisely 
that it makes lack of allegiance and loyalty the central element in defining crimes against citizenship. 
But to paraphrase Aldous Huxley, loyalty and allegiance are like happiness. They are byproducts of 
other activities. Fostering love of country is a valid aspiration of states and worth cultivating. But it 
cannot be manufactured by the carrot of a citizenship oath (as Joppke has elsewhere acknowledged), 
nor will it be conjured by the stick of revocation. Law is not adept at producing sentiment on 
command. 
                                                     
9
 The various legal strategies currently in use to detect, deter, prevent and respond to terrorism can and do fail, sometimes 
tragically and spectacularly. Is this because states have not arrogated to themselves sufficient coercive powers, or do 
inadequate human, technical and financial resources explain more about operational failure?  
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Space constraints have led me to focus on those submissions that directly challenge my own 
position, and I have not responded to the cogent, provocative and creative insights offered by so many 
contributors. My own thinking has been deepened and provoked by them, for which I express 
gratitude and appreciation. I admit that I took as my remit citizenship revocation only in the literal, 
legal sense. I also acknowledge the criticism that confining my focus to citizenship revocation does 
not pay due regard to the claim, for example, that deportation of non-citizens may also constitute 
banishment in some circumstances, with attendant human rights implications. I hope that nothing I 
have said here gives the appearance of foreclosing or prejudging broader or different conceptions of 
banishment. There is always more to be said, and much to be done.  
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